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The primary goal of this research is to identify and evaluate gaps to understand the 
need for defining and developing readiness metrics for the United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) in information/knowledge management (I/KM) and needs assessments (NA). The 
primary research question is: How can the USMC better complete NA and I/KM activities 
in support of humanitarian operations? Research methods included education from formal 
training courses, a review of relevant literature, analysis of four historical case studies from 
2010 to 2015, and personal interviews with prominent members in the field. This research 
examines USMC-unique capabilities to explain how the USMC can best fulfill its role, 
within the frameworks established by humanitarian organizations, in the most efficient and 
effective manner. We offer specific refinements to guide Marines in future planning of NA 
and I/KM efforts. In applying these refinements, Marine planners must tailor traditional 
practices with a shift in perspective from militant to humanitarian, wherein the USMC will 
serve as a supporting effort within a much larger international response. No two 
humanitarian responses can be the same; nevertheless, the well-grounded findings of this 
research related to NA and I/KM offer a basis of understanding for USMC planners to 
apply in any foreign natural HA/DR setting. 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) mandates the United States Marine Corps 
(USMC), and all United States (U.S.) armed forces, to conduct, support, and lead stability 
operations with a level of proficiency equivalent to combat operations (Department of 
Defense [DoD], 2009). The USMC prepares and trains to support humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations on a regular basis. The USMC prepares for HA/DR 
through deployment of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and other Marine Air 
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) elements. Training and readiness for such HA/DR missions 
require the assigned mission-essential tasks (METs) to be completed. We study and 
propose readiness metrics for HA/DR operations to reduce redundancy in training and 
increase efficiency and effectiveness in supporting the humanitarian missions for the 
USMC. The following is our primary research question: What are the guiding principles 
for the USMC in support of HA/DR operations? Our secondary research question is as 
follows: What can the USMC do to better prepare for HA/DR operations? We focus on 
information and knowledge management (I/KM) and needs assessments (NAs) and make 
recommendations for further research into the other essential capabilities of humanitarian 
operations. 
A. BACKGROUND 
From 1996 to 2015, 1,346,196 deaths were caused by natural disasters throughout 
the world (Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters [CRED], n.d.). Mass 
destruction from natural disasters is a familiar reality for many of the most vulnerable 
countries. For example, the Republic of the Philippines was impacted by 88 typhoons 
between 2004 and 2014, which caused USD $13.7 billion in damages and over 18,000 
deaths (Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance [CFE-
DMHA], 2015). Furthermore, these disasters have been on the rise. In 1970, 81 natural 
disasters occurred per continent; by 2015, that number had risen to 346 (Apte, Goncalves, 
& Yoho, 2016). The United States has responded to this upward trend with increased 
funding and action in humanitarian operations. U.S. expenditures for humanitarian 
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assistance in 2012 were over $3.8 billion (Apte et al., 2016). Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates said in 2007, 
Until our government decides to plus up our civilian agencies like the 
Agency for International Development (USAID), Army soldiers can expect 
to be tasked with reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and 
promoting good governance. All these so-called “nontraditional” 
capabilities have moved into the mainstream of military thinking, planning, 
and strategy—where they must stay. (Humanitarian Assistance Response 
Training [HART] course, personal communication, September 26–29, 
2017)1 
USAID’s mission, established in 1961, is to “partner to end extreme poverty and 
promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity” (U.S. 
Agency for International Development [USAID], 2017a). Within USAID is the U.S. Office 
of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). OFDA is the lead federal agency responsible for 
the organization and management of foreign disaster assistance (Joint Humanitarian 
Operations Course [JHOC], personal communication, September 18–19, 2017).2 Military 
organizations are requested to support an HA/DR operation only if a unique capability is 
required, civilian organizations have been overwhelmed with high demand, or civilian 
authorities request assistance (JHOC, personal communication, September 18–19, 2017). 
It is important to remember that DoD support is not the first resort of the United States 
government (USG), but when necessary, the DoD plays a crucial role in the ability of the 
USG to provide appropriate disaster relief. OFDA responds to an average of 65 disasters 
in over 50 countries each year (USAID, 2017b), of which the DoD has supported around 
5% historically (Wilhelm, 2015). Figure 1 provides an overview of the process to request 
USG assistance and DoD support. 
                                                 
1 This information comes from the author’s class notes while attending the Humanitarian Assistance 
Response Training course at the Ford Island Conference Center in Honolulu, HI, from September 26–29, 
2017. The course was presented by the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian 
Assistance and was sponsored by U.S. Pacific Command. 
2 This information comes from the author’s class notes while attending the Joint Humanitarian 
Operations Course at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. The course was presented by the 
U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance, and was 
sponsored by the Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School.  
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Figure 1. Interagency Coordination Flow When OFDA and DoD Respond. 
Source: Wilhelm (2015). 
 
The DoD plays an invaluable role in providing worldwide support in response to 
HA/DR operations and utilizes the USMC as a key responder. Due to expeditionary and 
littoral specialties, the Marine Corps is especially well suited for HA/DR operations. 
Recent examples in which a USMC unit was the main effort of a HA/DR Joint Task Force 
(JTF) include the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, 2011 tsunami in Japan, 2013 typhoon in the 
Philippines, and 2015 earthquake in Nepal. These natural disasters in the recent past 
provide significant data on the USG and DoD responses and an opportunity for the USMC 
to hone its ability to support future HA/DR operations. If the USMC continues to support 
HA/DR operations in the future, it should strive to achieve efficiency and effectiveness by 
applying lessons learned from these operations and the humanitarian field. Major 
limitations of the USMC include limited organizational knowledge on how to conduct NA 
and I/KM within the context of HA/DR rather than combat operations. We seek to derive 
recommendations in order to address this major limitation based on the four disasters 
previously mentioned. 
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1. Haiti Earthquake 2010: Operation Unified Response 
On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck one of the poorest 
countries in the Western Hemisphere with an epicenter approximately 14 miles southwest 
of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The destruction and effects were widespread and devastating to 
both the local population and the government of Haiti (GOH). Up to 3.9 million people 
within a 41-mile radius were affected with moderate to severe damage (Marine Corps 
Center for Lessons Learned [MCCLL], 2010). Initial estimates included 230,000 dead, 
300,000 injured, and over one million displaced, including 45,000 Americans. 
Furthermore, the earthquake caused widespread destruction to the infrastructure, rendered 
the majority of air and sea transport facilities inoperable, and devastated the already 
marginal power grid where there was a lack of petroleum reserves for generators (DiOrio, 
2010). Hours later, President Rene Preval of Haiti declared a state of emergency and 
requested assistance from the United States and international community. The U.S. 
interagency coordination flow in response to the Haitian request for assistance is depicted 
in Figure 1. 
The international community responded to relief demands with overwhelming 
support. The U.S. ambassador to Haiti issued a disaster declaration confirming the disaster 
and recommended USG assistance. U.S. President Barack Obama received the request and 
declared U.S. relief efforts to Haiti a priority, with the USAID designated as the lead 
agency (MCCLL, 2010). Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
issued an executive order on January 13, 2010, authorizing the U.S. military to provide 
HA/DR support designated as Operation Unified Response (Cecchine et al., 2013). U.S. 
Southern Command (U.S. SOUTHCOM) stood up Joint Task Force Haiti (JTF-H) and 
assigned its deputy commander, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ken Keen, as the commander 
of JTF-H. At the peak of operations, the U.S. military response included more than 22,200 
U.S. military personnel, 33 U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard ships, and more than 300 
fixed and rotary wing aircraft (Cecchine et al., 2013). U.S. actions taken within the first 
three days in response to the earthquake in Haiti are depicted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. U.S. Actions Taken in First Three Days in Response to Haiti 
Earthquake. Source: Cecchine et al. (2013). 
 
In addition to the U.S. military, more than 43 other militaries from around the world 
assisted in providing relief, including medical and rescue teams from Canada, Russia, 
France, Chile, Peru, Jamaica, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Iceland, Sri Lanka, China, and 
Korea. In total, over 140 nations and more than 500 non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and private organizations responded to Haiti with special teams and supplies, even 
with little to no knowledge of the relief resources available prior to arrival in Haiti 
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(Cecchine et al., 2013; DiOrio, 2010) However, the international response did not come 
without turmoil. 
With such a large international response, coordination and collaboration in the first 
few days was chaotic at best. The United States was accused by Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, 
and Nicaragua of attempting to occupy Haiti, but the United States rejected the allegations 
by stating they were explicitly there by “invitation of the Haitian Government” (DiOrio, 
2010, p. 3). However, the United Nations (U.N.) established control by designating the 
United States as the lead responsible for ports, airports, and roads for distribution of 
humanitarian assistance (HA) while the U.N. remained responsible for law and order. As 
the lead organization designated by the USG, USAID utilized OFDA to establish an NGO 
coordination cell. However, “limited personnel, insufficient resources, bureaucratic 
hurdles and diverse political agendas amongst the agencies” hindered its responsiveness 
and effectiveness (DiOrio, 2010, p. 4). 
2. Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 2011: Operation Tomodachi 
On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake occurred approximately 80 miles 
off the shore of Sendai, Japan. Sendai is located on the eastern coast of Honshu Island, 
Japan’s main island. In less than one hour, enormous tsunami waves pushed up to six miles 
inland, devastating an area of more than 348 square miles. The affected population included 
14.8 million people, with 129,500 houses destroyed and 265,432 homes severely damaged 
(Moroney, Pezard, Miller, Engstrom, & Doll, 2013). Approximately 1.4 million homes 
were left without running water and 1.25 million without electricity. The combined 
earthquake and tsunami damaged over 2,000 roads, 56 bridges, and 26 railways. 
Additionally, the communications infrastructure was severely impacted, including 2,000 
transmission stations for mobile phones destroyed, which “inhibited early estimates of the 
extent of the damage” (Moroney et al., 2013, p. 88). Six months after the disaster, the 
government of Japan (GOJ) determined the combined earthquake and tsunami resulted in 
over 16,000 deaths, 5,000 other injuries, 4,647 people unaccounted for, and 131,000 people 
still displaced (Moroney et al., 2013). 
 7 
In addition to this destruction, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant suffered 
major damage, creating another disaster in and of itself. The earthquake caused power 
outages at the plant, and the subsequent tsunami caused significant flooding at the plant 
and rendered the backup generators inoperable. Without any means of power, the cooling 
system required for the nuclear reactors failed and resulted in several explosions and the 
release of radiation (Carafano, 2011). 
Japan’s internal response to the disaster highlights the comparative difference 
between a developed nation and many of the underdeveloped nations struck by natural 
disasters. The combination of the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster were 
unprecedented for Japan and anything the world had experienced up to that point. Unlike 
many countries struck by a natural disaster, Japan was able to provide much of its own 
relief and requested comparatively little support from other nations for such a chaotic 
event. Within the first week, Japan deployed 100,000 personnel, more than 500 fixed and 
rotary wing aircraft, and 60 ships (Moroney et al., 2013). The Japan Civil Network for 
Disaster Relief in East Japan served as organizer and lead agency. This group coordinated 
over 300 organizations, including GOJ agencies, NGOs, and civil organizations (Moroney 
et al., 2013). 
The international response to the Japan earthquake was overwhelming. At the 
request of Japan, a U.N. Disaster Assessment and Coordination team assisted the GOJ with 
coordinating international assistance and limiting unsolicited contributions (Moroney et 
al., 2013). Within the first three days, 91 countries and nine international organizations 
(IOs) offered assistance. Within three weeks, the Japanese Red Cross received more than 
$1 billion in donations (Moroney et al., 2013). 
On March 11, Japan declared a national disaster and requested support from the 
United States. The DoD announced Operation Tomodachi, meaning friends, which 
continued until May 1, 2011. The GOJ initially requested support from the United States 
including search and rescue teams, airlift capacity, and nuclear subject matter experts 
(Moroney et al., 2013). By April 2011, the United States had provided $95 million in 
humanitarian funding to Japan: $88 million from the DoD and $7 million from 
USAID/OFDA in response to the disaster (Moroney et al., 2013). On March 11, U.S. 
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Pacific Command (U.S. PACOM) released a task order designating the commander, U.S. 
Forces Japan (USFJ), as the supported operational commander to provide foreign 
humanitarian assistance to Japan. However, USFJ contained no operational planning 
capability. U.S. PACOM provided a forward command element to USFJ and subsequently 
established multiple organizations: JTF-505 for phased evacuations of American citizens 
and designated foreign nationals; Joint Support Force Japan (JTF-519) for HA/DR support; 
and a Consequence Management Support Force (CMSF) for the nuclear crisis (Moroney 
et al., 2013). 
3. Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) 2013: Operation Damayan 
Category 5 Super Typhoon Haiyan, also known as Yolanda, made landfall over the 
Visayas region of the Philippines on November 8, 2013 (Luckey, 2014). Filipino 
communities were still recovering from a 7.2 magnitude earthquake in the region on 15 
October and a civil conflict in the Mindanao region (Luckey, 2014). These recent events 
depleted the country’s emergency supply stores and destabilized the area. Local Filipino 
governments were advised to conduct evacuations of coastal regions, which included 
70,000 people residing in temporary shelters after displacement as a result of the October 
15 earthquake. As of 6:00 a.m. on November 8, 125,604 people were successfully 
evacuated (CFE-DMHA, 2014). Shipping and commercial travel in and out of the 
Philippines were cancelled on November 7 in anticipation of the typhoon’s arrival. When 
Haiyan delivered up to 200 mph winds with gusts of 225 mph, damage to infrastructure 
was widespread and disastrous (Parker, Carroll, Sanders, King, & Chiu, 2015). Much of 
this damage was amplified by flooding caused by heavy rains of over one inch per hour 
and a storm surge of over 23 feet (CFE-DMHA, 2014). The storm affected nine out of the 
nation’s 17 regions (CFE-DMHA, 2014). The regions of Leyte and Samar received the 
heaviest damage, with the city of Tacloban losing as much as 90% of its infrastructure 
(Parker et al., 2015). Figure 3, which comes from one of the earliest situational reports, 
shows the path of the storm (Association of Southeast Asian Nations Coordinating Centre 
for Humanitarian Assistance [AHA Centre], 2013). This disaster claimed the lives of 6,293 
people, with 28,689 injured and 4 million people displaced (Parker et al., 2015). Over one 
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million houses were damaged, with more than half of these completely destroyed (Parker 
et al., 2015).  
Figure 3. Forecasted Path of Typhoon Haiyan. Source: AHA Centre (2013). 
 
The Philippine government issued a request for humanitarian assistance on 
November 10, only a day after the storm made landfall (Bautista, 2013). Three U.N. 
Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) teams were deployed to conduct needs 
assessments (AHA Centre, 2013). President Benigno Aquino officially declared a state of 
national calamity on November 11. On the same day as this declaration, USAID began 
delivering supplies to Villamore airbase in the capital city of Manila. The distribution of 
this aid is no small task with over 7,000 islands making up the Republic of the Philippines. 
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Aid was delivered to the island of Luzon, which was largely spared from the storm’s 
destruction. The international community banded together, with assistance coming from 
57 countries, 29 foreign militaries, and NGOs from around the globe (CFE-DMHA, 2014). 
However, phasing the combined international assistance takes time. Therefore, DoD 
assistance was requested in order to rapidly respond to the lack of immediate response 
capabilities available. Unique DoD contributions included mainly heavy lift capabilities, 
access to remote locations, and rapid deployment of these capabilities (CFE-DMHA, 
2014). 
Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) was designated as the lead for the military 
effort within U.S. PACOM. 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) was designated as 
the mission commander until JTF-505 was established on 16 November with Lieutenant 
General Wissler, commanding general, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), designated 
as the joint forces commander (JFC) (Luckey, 2014). JTF-505 became fully operational 
capable on November 20. The joint forces included the USS George Washington and parts 
of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 5 (Parker et al., 2015). After only six days of full operational 
capability, the JTF commander reported on November 26 that the humanitarian community 
was prepared to continue aid efforts without DoD assistance or unique DoD capabilities. 
Philippine relief efforts transitioned to recovery efforts within two weeks of the disaster 
(CFE-DMHA, 2014). The JTF was finally disestablished after completing its transition on 
December 1. The JTF relief effort included 13,400 military personnel, 66 aircraft, and 12 
U.S. Navy (USN) vessels. These assets successfully delivered 2,495 tons of supplies and 
evacuated over 21,000 people throughout roughly 450 locations by completing over 1,300 
air sorties (Parker et al., 2015). Much of the humanitarian community agrees that the civil-
military coordination that occurred in support of the Typhoon Haiyan relief was extremely 
successful and possibly the best in recent history (CFE-DMHA, 2014).  
4. Nepal Earthquake 2015: Operation Sahayogi Haat 
The most recent large-scale USMC HA/DR operation was Operation Sahayogi 
Haat conducted in response to the 2015 Earthquake in Nepal. On April 25, 2015, a 7.8 
magnitude earthquake struck near Barpak, Gorkha District, Nepal, approximately 109 
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miles northwest of the nation’s capital of Kathmandu. On May 12, a 7.2 magnitude 
aftershock also struck near Kathmandu in the Dolakha district, with the epicenter 
approximately 50 miles northeast of the nation’s capital. The epicenter of this aftershock 
was located only 10 miles beneath the earth’s surface, and its seismic shaking was 
increased by the soft soils of the heavily populated Kathmandu Valley. Hundreds of other 
aftershocks over a 4.0 magnitude occurred throughout the region, further increasing the 
destruction and complicating relief efforts. These earthquakes caused as many as 5,000 
landslides, many of which diverted rivers and streams, flooding low-lying areas in the 
region. The widespread destruction of infrastructure was compounded by the loosely 
enforced building codes and high levels of poverty throughout the affected region. In the 
months following these events, it was estimated that the total destruction included 8,841 
deaths, 22,309 injuries, and destruction of or damage to 887,356 homes. Table 1 lists the 
total destruction caused in this disaster (CFE-DMHA, 2016; Troutman, 2016). 
Table 1. Nepal Earthquake Destruction Statistics. Source: 
CFE-DMHA (2016). 
 
On April 25, the government of Nepal (GON) declared a state of emergency and 
requested assistance from the international community. The overall international response 
included military assistance from 34 countries (CFE-DMHA, 2016) with India, China, and 
the United States serving as the three largest contributors. The primary contributing 
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international organizations (IOs) included the World Health Organization, World Food 
Program, American Red Cross, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), and hundreds of others. Nepal requested $422 million in funding to support relief 
efforts, which was met with a resounding response including over $64 million in funding 
from the USG (USAID, 2015). 
The DoD responded quickly to Nepal’s requests for assistance. Although separated 
by over 2,500 miles from Okinawa, Japan, MARFORPAC led the U.S. PACOM response 
to the disaster. U.S. PACOM stood up JTF-505 on May 1 and appointed III MEF 
Commanding General (CG) Lieutenant General Whissler as the commander of JTF-505. 
The first Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) from USAID was released on April 29 and 
included a request to deploy a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) to conduct 
needs assessments in coordination with the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team 
(DART). This HAST team was intended to “advise on DoD capabilities and assets that 
could support the response” (Bock, 2016, p. 44). In response, 3d MEB immediately 
deployed a 22-member HAST, which met the DART in Kathmandu on April 29. JTF-505 
successfully completed a total of 25 MITAMS in support of USAID and concluded 
Operation Sahayogi Haat on May 26, 2015 (Bock, 2016, p. 44). The overarching mission, 
as defined in these MITAMs, focused on airfield logistics and provision of rotary wing 
assets to transport supplies and personnel to and from remote areas. Key challenges 
associated with Operation Sahayogi Haat included the logistical burden of covering the 
distance from Okinawa to Kathmandu, overcoming the technical mountainous terrain of 
Nepal to reach remote areas affected by the disaster, and the political challenges of 
receiving overflight permissions and conducting operations within strictly defined areas of 
operation (AOs) dedicated solely to India, China, and the United States (CFE-DMHA, 
2016). The severity of these challenges was punctuated by the tragic death of six Marines, 
two Nepalese soldiers, and five Nepalese citizens in a UH-1Y helicopter crash on May 12 
(Troutman, 2016). Furthermore, the establishment of an intermediate support base was 
required in U-Tapao, Thailand, to facilitate the numerous flights generated throughout the 
Pacific and arriving in Kathmandu. The timeline of U.S. PACOM’s response during 
Operation Sahayogi Haat is depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. U.S. PACOM Significant Events. Source: CFE-DMHA (2016). 
 
At the completion of Operation Sahayogi Haat, JTF-505 successfully delivered 
113.8 short tons of aid, transported 63 casualties, flew 152 sorties, and provided airfield 
logistics supporting 1,813 short tons of aid from 63 flights (CFE-DMHA, 2016).  
B. MOTIVATION 
With the increasing number of disasters, both natural and manmade, around the 
world, the USMC is positioned as a force in readiness to respond to those disasters. 
Disasters create a demand that is generally inherent for USMC Marine Air-Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) commanders to support, and therefore, the disasters serve as opportunities 
to save lives and alleviate human suffering. Although there exists a significant amount of 
academic research on HA/DR operations, very little research addresses military support of 
those operations. Additionally, the USMC develops readiness standards with the primary 
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goal of conducting combat operations. Although there is an inherent overlap in 
requirements to support combat operations and HA/DR operations, we recognize that there 
is a potential gap in relevant literature. We aim to analyze the USMC role in information 
and knowledge management (I/KM) and needs assessment (NA) competencies in 
supporting HA/DR operations to recommend strategic-level capabilities required of the 
USMC to support such operations in the future. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
1. Scope 
The scope of our research is limited to foreign, natural, sudden onset, and localized 
disasters in which the USMC supported relief efforts. Additionally, we limited the scope 
of our data collection to recent disasters, those occurring between 2010 and 2017, and 
eliminated disasters in which insufficient information was available to conduct analysis, 
such as the Thailand flood of 2011. Therefore, the data analysis specifically includes the 
following four disasters: 2010 Haiti earthquake, Operation Unified Response; 2011 Japan 
earthquake and tsunami, Operation Tomodachi; 2013 Philippines Typhoon Haiyan 
(Yolanda), Operation Damayan; and 2015 Nepal earthquake, Operation Sahayogi Haat. 
Lastly, the scope of our research was narrowed to data pertaining specifically to the NA 
and I/KM competencies and USMC capabilities to support those competencies. 
2. Data and Analysis 
Research began with a thorough literature review to gain a baseline understanding 
of previous research, doctrine, and publications in the humanitarian field related to DoD 
HA/DR operations, I/KM, and NA. These four disasters are analyzed for HA/DR 
operations using open source USMC after action/lessons learned reports, government fact 
sheets, case studies, and other organizational analysis from throughout the humanitarian 
field. Furthermore, the cases are analyzed through first-hand knowledge attained after 
completion of both the Humanitarian Assistance Response Training (HART) and Joint 
Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC), as well as personal interviews conducted with 
USAID/OFDA and Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian 
Assistance (CFE-DMHA) staff. We seek to identify best practices and shortfalls of the 
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USMC in NA and I/KM during these operations in order to refine the role of the USMC in 
responding to future HA/DR operations. We compare identified gaps in response to 
strengths and capabilities of the USMC to determine its most effective employment for 
I/KM, and determine critical information required for the NA process. Our primary 
research question is, what are the guiding principles for the USMC in support of HA/DR 
operations? Our secondary research question is, what can the USMC do to better prepare 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. HUMANITARIAN DISASTERS 
The definition of a natural disaster is not consistent throughout the literature. One 
frequently used definition for a natural disaster is any natural event that results in 100 
human deaths, 100 human injuries, or U.S. $1 million in economic damages (Hewitt & 
Sheehan, 1969). Joint Publication 3-29 defines a disaster as  
a calamitous situation or event that occurs naturally (such as earthquakes, 
storms, droughts, volcanic eruptions, wildfires) or through human activities 
(such as industrial explosions or fires, civil strife, infectious disease) which 
threatens or inflicts human suffering on a scale that may warrant emergency 
relief assistance from the U.S. [government] or from foreign partners. 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2014, p. I-4) 
Furthermore, Joint Publication 3-29 defines foreign disaster relief as 
assistance that can be used immediately to alleviate the suffering of foreign 
disaster victims that normally includes services and commodities as well as 
the rescue and evacuation of victims; the provision and transportation of 
food, water, clothing, medicines, beds, bedding, and temporary shelter; the 
furnishing of medical equipment, medical and technical personnel; and 
making repairs to essential services. (CJCS, 2014, p. GL-7) 
Humanitarian disasters are typically classified as natural or manmade disasters. 
Disasters are further classified as localized or dispersed, and as slow or sudden (Apte, 
2009). The different combinations of these and other characteristics make humanitarian 
operations inherently chaotic and difficult to plan. Figure 5 illustrates how the level of 
difficulty in relief efforts required exponential increases during sudden disasters, dispersed 
over large areas such as with the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. 
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Figure 5. Classification of Disasters Based on Location and Time. 
Source: Apte (2009). 
 
B. HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS 
DoD Joint Publication 3-29 defines foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) as 
“Department of Defense (DoD) activities conducted outside the United States and its 
territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation” 
(CJCS, 2014, p. GL-7). Military capabilities are tailored for combat operations but have 
also proven themselves invaluable to international humanitarian disaster relief efforts. DoD 
FHA operations are in support of the host nation, and USAID is the lead federal agency. 
The USMC also works alongside many other foreign government organizations and non-
government organizations (NGOs) in a humanitarian operation. During the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti, over 900 NGOs registered to respond (Tatham & Christopher, 2014). 
All participants in an HA/DR operation are compelled to embody four principles widely 
accepted by humanitarian organizations and endorsed by the United Nations (U.N.): 
“humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence” (CJCS, 2014, p. I-3). These 
principles each promote the idea that responding organizations must subordinate other 
interests to the needs of the affected population to work together without hostility or 
conflicts of interests. An understanding of these principles must guide all military planners 
as they prepare for a HA/DR operations (CJCS, 2014). 
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Numerous publications outline various phases of a humanitarian operation (Altay 
& Green, 2006; Apte, 2009; Cozzolino, 2012; Kovacs & Spens, 2007; Van Wassenhove, 
2006). The phases of a humanitarian operation, as outlined by Kovacs and Spens (2009) 
are “preparation, immediate response, and reconstruction” (p. 11). Apte, Goncalves and 
Yoho (2016) outlined the key stages of humanitarian operations as preparedness, relief 
response, recovery, and development (p. 10). Cozzolino (2012) defined a disaster 
management cycle as comprised of four phases: mitigation, preparation, response, and 
reconstruction, as depicted in Figure 6.  
Figure 6. Humanitarian Logistics Stream. Source: Cozzolino (2012). 
  
The mitigation stage refers to actions, such as the creation of laws or institutions, 
taken by governments to decrease the social vulnerability of a population to the effects of 
a natural disaster. The preparation phase includes actions of governments and humanitarian 
organizations that enable a timely and effective response to humanitarian disasters, such as 
the stockpiling of supplies and organization of efforts among the various actors. The 
response phase consists of the collaborative immediate response actions and the restoration 
of basic essential goods and services to the greatest number of recipients possible. The 
reconstruction phase includes various actions taken in response to a disaster to prepare for 
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long-term recovery, such as repair and construction of road networks and logistical supply 
chains (Cozzolino, 2012).  
The 2005 Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) and the resulting U.N. Cluster 
Approach (CA) is arguably the largest international attempt to increase coordination among 
the multitude of humanitarian actors and innovatively restructure operations (Tatham & 
Christopher, 2014). The 2005 HRR evaluated the response of the 2004 Asian tsunami, 
which identified many shortcomings of the humanitarian community in terms of 
predictability, efficiency, and effectiveness (Allende & Anaya, 2010). Major areas 
identified for improvement included accessing reliable funding, strengthening 
humanitarian coordination efforts, and increasing the capacity of the collective 
humanitarian organizations to meet the needs of large populations affected by disasters 
(Tatham & Christopher, 2014). The CA is meant to address the deficiencies related to 
capacity. The CA organizes humanitarian functions into 11 clusters and designates a lead 
organization to each cluster. Industry leaders agree that the cluster approach is a major 
change to the way that humanitarian missions are coordinated on a global scale (Tatham & 
Christopher, 2014). The list of clusters and the lead organizations are in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Humanitarian Function Clusters. Source: Cozzolino (2012). 
 
C. HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS 
Humanitarian operations are largely a function of logistics (Tatham & Christopher, 
2014). Humanitarian organizations spend as much as 60–80% of their expenditures on 
logistics (Tatham & Christopher, 2014). This is not surprising when taking into account 
the immense complexity of managing supplies, transportation, health services, 
maintenance, or general engineering in the context of a displaced, desperate, and remote 
population with a damaged national infrastructure. The definition of humanitarian logistics 
is a “special branch of logistics which manages response supply chain of critical supplies 
and services with challenges such as demand surges, uncertain supplies, critical time 
windows in face of infrastructure vulnerabilities and vast scope and size of the operations” 
(Apte, 2009, p. 17).  
These challenges are amplified by numerous actors in a humanitarian operation that 
seek to attain unity of effort in a chaotic setting (Tatham & Christopher, 2014). Donors 
may contribute goods to the relief efforts that ignore the needs and culture of the population 
(Tatham & Christopher, 2014). Examples of this include sending pork products to the 
Middle East or teddy bears to earthquake victims. Such unsolicited donations cause 
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bottlenecks in the operation because volunteers and staff must sort through poorly 
organized deliveries (Van Wassenhove, 2006). Speed, efficiency, and cost effectiveness 
can be achieved in HA/DR only by maximizing coordination among all the actors and by 
prioritizing actions to meet the greatest needs first (Cozzolino, 2012). This aid must be 
delivered all the way to the point of consumption, including last mile distribution 
(Cozzolino, 2012). Last mile distribution is a metaphorical term used in the logistics field 
referring to the last leg of a distribution route required to get a product to the end user 
(Apte, 2009). Last mile distribution in HA/DR is one of the greatest challenges for 
humanitarian logisticians (Apte, 2009). According to the principles of humanity and 
impartiality, relief aid should be delivered right to those with the greatest need, which are 
often in the hardest-to-reach places (U.N., n.d.). Last mile distribution is rarely conducted 
by USAID or military members without the support of the host nation or NGOs (JHOC, 
personal communication, September 18–19, 2017). Problems such as the last mile 
distribution, uncertain demand, political volatility, and chaotic operating conditions 
prevent humanitarian logisticians from using the same methods as the commercial sector 
(Van Wassenhove, 2006). Tatham and Christopher, in their 2014 work, listed some of the 
starkest differences between commercial and humanitarian logistics, shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7. Commercial Logistics versus Humanitarian Logistics. Source: Tatham 
and Christopher (2014). 
ASPECT COMMERCIAL HUMANITARIAN 
PURPOSE Economic profit Social impact 
CONTEXT Uninterrupted Interrupted 
PERSPECTIVE ON TIME Time is money Time is life (or death) 
PEOPLE SERVED Paying customers Beneficiaries 
SOURCE OF FUNDS Paying customers Donors 
WORKFORCE Paid staff Volunteers; staff 
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D. CORE COMPETENCIES WITHIN ESSENTIAL SERVICES AND 
CAPABILITIES 
Each one of the four phases of a humanitarian operation has specific and perhaps 
unique capability requirements. In their 2016 work, Apte et al. surveyed logisticians from 
various humanitarian organizations to determine the most widely accepted core capabilities 
in humanitarian organizations. Respondents to the study placed approximately 80% of all 
humanitarian actions within one of the following six essential services and capabilities: 
information and knowledge management, needs assessment, supply, deployment and 
distribution, health services support, or collaboration and governance (see Figure 8; Apte 
et al., 2016). Humanitarian and military organizations have different core competencies 
within these six essential services and capabilities. 
Figure 8. Essential Services and Capabilities for Disaster Response. 
Source: Apte et al. (2016). 
  
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) provided an overview of competencies that can be 
considered core to an organization. Three requirements of a core competency are to 
contribute to the end needs of the customer, to be difficult to replicate, and to potentially 
provide access in varying markets (Apte et al., 2016; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). The 
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humanitarian and military organizational core competencies within these six essential 
capabilities are different. Apte et al. (2016) described the military and non-military core 
competencies, as shown in Figure 9.  
Figure 9. Military and Nonmilitary Core Competencies. 
Source: Apte et al. (2016). 
 
These military core competencies were developed with personnel, equipment, and 
training that was not initially designed for humanitarian operations but rather with 
primarily combat operations in mind. This anomaly as well as multiple other factors causes 
variances in performance for military organizations acting to support humanitarian relief 
efforts. In response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, for example, the USMC conducted rotary 
aircraft assessments in accordance with their aerial surveillance core competency but failed 
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to complete assessments in remote locations that were badly in need of relief (Gastrock & 
Iturriaga, 2013). This paper specifically focuses on the core competencies of information 
and knowledge management (I/KM) and needs assessments (NAs). We now discuss these 
two core competencies in detail and the other competencies briefly, in terms of their 
contributions to the essential services and capabilities of humanitarian operations. 
1. Information and Knowledge Management 
Information and knowledge management (I/KM) is a core competency of both 
military and nonmilitary organizations (NMOs). Although information sharing can be 
considered a form of collaboration and therefore a separate competency, the debate of 
where to place information sharing categorically should be considered less important than 
the important role that information sharing plays in humanitarian operations (Zhang, Zhou, 
& Nunamaker, 2002). Tatham and Spens (2011) described information management as a 
“hierarchy of increasing complexity” from data to information and then knowledge. 
Tatham and Spens (2011) defined this hierarchy as follows: 
1. Data. A collection of related facts usually organized in a particular format 
such as a table or database and gathered for a particular purpose. 
2. Information. Data that have been interpreted, verbalized, translated, or 
transformed to reveal the underlying meaning or context. 
3. Knowledge. The internalization of information, data, and experience. This 
can be further subdivided into 
• tacit knowledge, which is the personal knowledge resident within the 
mind, behavior, and perceptions of individual members of the 
organization; and 
• explicit knowledge, which is the formal, recorded, or systematic 
knowledge that can easily be accessed transmitted or stored in computer 
files or hard copy. (p. 13) 
For this paper, we are primarily concerned with data, information, and explicit knowledge.  
The first critical step in I/KM is to interpret the effects of the disaster and then to 
translate that into an understanding of the required response. Proper implementation 
facilitates an organization’s ability to answer broad questions initially and narrow the scope 
as time and information become available. The key questions should include the following: 
When did the disaster happen? Who did the disaster affect? What critical infrastructure and 
services are no longer available? Where is disaster aid demand the highest? How should 
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local authorities and responders coordinate support? Finally, how much relief aid is 
required to support the demand (Apte & Yoho, 2012, p. 8)? Analysis and assessment of 
information for the purposes of determining gaps are covered under the needs assessment 
competency.  
Information gathering, sharing, and management is a constant cycle that transcends 
phases of both disaster response and humanitarian relief. Successful humanitarian logistics 
is dependent upon information management (Apte, 2009). Supply chains must be agile 
enough to be effective, and they “can only achieve agility through an effective information 
infrastructure and knowledge of requirements in the affected area” (Apte, 2009, p. 68). The 
three characteristics of a quality information system are “visibility, transparency, and 
accountability” (Apte, 2009, p. 68).  
a. Information Management and the U.S. Military 
The USMC, and the U.S. military more broadly, is poised to facilitate information 
management using many of its collection assets, known to the military as intelligence 
gathering (Apte et al., 2016). However, the use of the word intelligence brings forth a 
negative connotation in the humanitarian community because it is often associated with 
spying or secretly collecting information. Therefore, the word information should be used 
in its place when referring to intelligence gathering activities during the support of HA/DR 
operations (JHOC, personal communication, September 18–19, 2017; HART, class notes, 
September 26–29, 2017). The litany of intelligence gathering assets available to the USMC 
include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, such as manned and 
unmanned aviation platforms, human intelligence personnel, satellite imagery, and open 
source data analysis. However, these are not all unique military assets, especially in a 
growing age of technology in which drones are becoming a common employment tool and 
organizations such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and 
the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) provide high quality open source and satellite imagery 
analysis. 
Information sharing and management in support of HA/DR operations is best 
achieved by maximizing the use of unclassified domains and information (DoD, 2011; 
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HART, personal communication, September 26–29, 2017; JHOC, personal 
communication, September 18–19, 2017). The DoD currently utilizes the All Partners 
Access Network (APAN) site as its primary means of information sharing and 
management. However, there are many sites across the humanitarian community that serve 
much of that same purpose. Table 3 lists several of the most common sites utilized regularly 




Table 3. Information Gathering and Sharing Sites Commonly Used by the 
Humanitarian Community 
Name Site Owner 
CFE Website https://www.cfe-dmha.org/ Center for Excellence in Disaster 
Management and Humanitarian 
Assistance 
ReliefWeb http://reliefweb.int/ U.N. Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 
Virtual OSOCC http://vosocc.unocha.org/ U.N. Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 
Global Disaster Alert 
and Coordination 
System (GDACS) 
http://www.gdacs.org/ U.N. Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 
Humanitarian Response http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/ U.N. Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 
OCHA 3W http://3w.unocha.org/WhoWhatWhere/ U.N. Office for the Coordination of 







http://www.foreignassistance.gov U.S. Government—Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance 
Foreign Aid Explorer https://explorer.usaid.gov/  U.S. Government—U.S. Agency 
for International Development 
Pacific Disaster Center 
Website 
http://www.pdc.org Pacific Disaster Center  




Information sharing plays a critical role in the efficiency and effectiveness of 
disaster relief (Altay & Pal, 2014). Combatant commanders and JTF staffs often demand a 
great deal of information to develop a common operational picture when responding to a 
disaster. With many resources, including personnel and equipment, to gather and process 
both primary and secondary data, the U.S. military is well-positioned to share information 
with the humanitarian community. Altay and Pal (2014) found that trust is a key element 
of information sharing in the humanitarian community. It is important to point out that 
close association with the military often violates the commonly accepted humanitarian 
principle of impartiality unless that sharing is done openly, with all organizations having 
equal access to the same information (HART, personal communication, September 26–29, 
2017; JHOC, personal communication, September 18–19, 2017). By using the numerous 
open source information sharing platforms available and attending meetings at the 
Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC), Humanitarian–Military Operations 
Coordination Centre (HUMOCC), and so forth, the military can play a vital role in sharing 
information and increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of other actors supporting 
disaster relief efforts. 
No two disasters are identical, but all disasters have similarities in the demand for 
information management. The following list provides some of the most relevant 
information that may be shared between the humanitarian community and the military 
during a disaster, according to the United Nations (n.d.): 
• Presence, capabilities, and assets of military forces, including the time and 
scale of their Full Operating Capability and the end of deployment 
• Requirements of military support for humanitarian assistance 
• Relief activities undertaken by the military and assessment results 
• Humanitarian assessment data, strategic response plans and gaps, ongoing 
humanitarian activities, and coordination structures 
• Status of main supply routes and key infrastructures 
• Population movements or potential security threats resulting from the 
natural disaster. (p. 12) 
b. Knowledge Management and the U.S. Military 
After the collection and storage of information, the USMC faces the task of 
knowledge management. This is especially challenging for the military due to the high 
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turnover rate that is common in deployed units supporting HA/DR missions (Apte & Yoho, 
2012). The use of after action reports (AARs) and the lessons learned consolidated by the 
Marine Corps’ Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) and the Joint Center for Lessons 
Learned (JCLL) enable units and commanders to access the knowledge gained through 
previous operations and exercises. Furthermore, military units retain explicit knowledge 
(Tatham & Spens, 2011) through the development of concept of operations guides such as 
the U.S. PACOM Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Concept of Operations (FHA 
CONOPS). However, explicit knowledge does not have the same level of impact gained 
through first-hand, tacit knowledge. Therefore, a negative learning curve is assumed as 
military command staffs continue to rotate (Tatham & Spens, 2011). 
U.S. PACOM represents the majority of DoD responses to natural disasters and as 
such, is viewed as the model for the development of explicit knowledge in the DoD for 
HA/DR operations. As previously discussed, U.S. PACOM (2015) published the FHA 
CONOPS and the Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Knowledge/Information Management 
Guide. The guide “is designed to improve interoperability U.S. PACOM-wide” (U.S. 
PACOM, 2015, p. 7). For each new disaster that U.S. PACOM responds to, a new 
information/knowledge management standard operating procedure (SOP) is developed 
specifically for that disaster. For instance, in 2013, U.S. PACOM published the Information 
Management/Knowledge Management SOP in support of Operation Damayan. This SOP 
was designed for the same purpose as the U.S. PACOM Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 
Knowledge/Information Management Guide. 
2. Needs Assessment  
Needs assessment (NA) is the second core capability in support of humanitarian 
operations. The primary purpose in this process is to define the host nation and affected 
population’s need because this will generate the requirements for capabilities necessary to 
accomplish a mission (Apte et al., 2016). The NA consists of consolidating information 
into an operational picture and generating requirements based on all available information. 
For the military, it is crucial to merge information collected through human, electronic, and 
imagery assets to form a well-defined scope, means, and end state of response in the form 
 31 
of a mission statement. However, the NA process is constantly reevaluated in the form of 
a decision cycle or input loop to redefine the required capabilities. Decision-making is 
crucial in an NA, but it must be done in a timely and accurate manner and under conditions 
in which uncertainty and a lack of information are prevalent (Apte, 2009).  
The humanitarian community has multiple organizations with authority for 
developing doctrine on NA, including the U.N. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), 
the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), the World Bank, and the Sphere Project. 
These organizations have different but complementary definitions, models, steps, and 
phases for conducting needs assessments, also referred to as “coordinated needs 
assessments” (ACAPS, 2014; IASC, 2012) or “common needs assessments” (Garfield, 
Blake, Chatainger, & Walton-Ellery, 2011, p. 1). ACAPS (2014) defined needs 
assessments as “how organizations identify and measure the humanitarian needs of a 
disaster-affected community” (p. 1). The Sphere Project, informed by ACAPS, presented 
a more detailed definition, which states that assessments identify “the priority needs of the 
disaster-affected population through a systematic assessment of the context, risks to life 
with dignity and the capacity of the affected people and relevant authorities to respond” 
(Currion, 2014, p. 8). The IASC definition combined this focus on actions and purpose 
with a simple definition of “the set of activities necessary to understand a given situation” 
(IASC, 2012, p. 6), and continued to specify a few of these activities, such as collection 
and analysis of data on the population, infrastructure, and economy (IASC, 2012). Each of 
these sources agree that assessments should inform and set humanitarian operational 
priorities with the current needs of the affected population.  
The purpose of NAs is, most importantly, to create a common operational 
understanding of host nation needs and priorities for the humanitarian community to act 
upon (IASC, 2012). It must be understood that NAs are not only for the organization 
conducting the NA but also for other humanitarian actors in the area of operation (IASC, 
2012). A common theme throughout NA literature is the importance of conducting 
assessments jointly. Coordinated assessments among multiple agencies have many 
advantages over a single agency’s assessment, such as efficiency, timeliness, coherence, 
effectiveness, coordination across agencies, and better information sharing (Garfield et al., 
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2011). By sharing this information, all actors will be better able to cover all affected areas 
by combining capacity and using resources more efficiently. Sharing information collected 
in an NA helps prevent the duplication of efforts and creates a baseline understanding for 
all actors to use during planning without overassessing the population and creating distrust 
among the affected people (IASC, 2012). An assessment should obtain the following key 
pieces of information (Garfield et al., 2011):  
• Scale and severity of destruction 
• Areas and people groups with the greatest need 
• Trends in the current situation that could continue to affect conditions 
• Gaps in the recovery efforts and areas where recovery capacity is 
insufficient 
• Coping strategies used by the affected population (p. 4) 
An assessment is used to collect both primary and secondary data. Primary data is 
collected through first-hand information. Examples of primary data collection methods 
include conducting site visits, collecting aerial reconnaissance, speaking with the affected 
population, or conducting community group discussions (ACAPS, 2014). Within the first 
72 hours, almost all primary information comes from the host nation. Secondary data is 
pre-existing and available to organizations via online or remote collection methods. 
Examples of secondary data include websites, situation reports, country data books, lessons 
learned reports, information sharing modems such as APAN or ReliefWeb, the media, 
imagery, and other responding agencies (ACAPS, 2014; IASC, 2012). Secondary 
information helps organizations build their awareness of the situation and formulate their 
response plan based on the host nation’s needs and existing capacity.  
a. Phases of an NA 
ACAPS (2014) outlined the following six steps to a successful or “good enough” 
NA, as illustrated in Figure 10: 
1. Preparing for an assessment 
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2. Designing the assessment 
3. Implementing the assessment 
4. Analyzing the data 
5. Sharing your findings 
6. Decision making 
Figure 10. Phases of Needs Assessment. Source: ACAPS (2014). 
 
This model is circular to illustrate that assessments must be continually conducted 
throughout an operation to maintain accurate current needs of the population and the 
capacity of the host nation (ACAPS, 2014). This continuous action also allows for an 
assessment to occur quickly after a disaster strikes with only enough information to make 
the most time-sensitive decisions. After the initial response has been sufficiently informed, 
information can be gathered in greater detail over a longer assessment and presented in a 
more thorough report. The goal of the initial assessments is to gather timely, relevant, and 
usable information for the humanitarian community to make informed decisions as soon as 
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possible (ACAPS, 2014). Each assessment builds upon the data that already exists from 
previous analysis (IASC, 2012).  
The IASC has developed a framework that includes several different types of 
assessments and their purposes. These include initial, rapid, and in-depth assessments 
(IASC, 2012). A key understanding with this framework is that each assessment will go 
through the phases described by ACAPS in Figure 10, but the assessment’s design and 
implementation will look different depending on the phase of the operation in which it is 
being conducted. Table 4 outlines this framework.
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Table 4. Framework for Assessments. Source: IASC (2012). 
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b. Multi-sector Initial Rapid Assessment 
Multi-sector initial rapid assessments (MIRAs) are an inter-agency effort designed 
to provide the humanitarian community a common operational picture of each cluster in 
order to develop a joint plan in response to sudden onset disasters (IASC, 2015). The MIRA 
framework provides guidance for the collection, analysis, dissemination, and reporting of 
NA information. However, the MIRA process does not provide statistically significant data 
or information for the planning of relief efforts to extremely specific locations. After the 
onset of a disaster, the MIRA must be one of the first humanitarian actions to take place. 
MIRA begins with the initial assessment.  
Initial assessments are intended to reach completion within 72 hours of the disaster 
occurrence. Most organizations are limited to the collection of secondary data during this 
time before they have any physical presence in the host nation. Primary data in the first 72 
hours is mainly collected by the host nation, which is directly observing the disaster’s 
effects and can conduct remote sensing to determine the population’s immediate needs. 
The initial assessment is meant to determine the scale and severity of the disaster and 
identify the critical needs of the population with emphasis on the most vulnerable groups 
(IASC, 2012). 
Even though the initial assessment is released 72 hours after a disaster, the ultimate 
MIRA report is designed to take two weeks to complete. The second phase of the MIRA 
implements a greater focus on primary data collection, joint efforts, and more detailed 
reporting. Primary data collection tools must be selected based on the priority information 
requirements (PIRs) of the operation. Primary data collection, as described by the IASC’s 
MIRA guidance should be “a mix of direct observation, key informant interviews, and 
community group discussions” (IASC, 2015, p. 14). The MIRA guidance recommends the 
use of experienced and trained personnel onboard field assessment teams tasked with 
primary data collection. The actual makeup of this field assessment team varies based on 
the disaster but must include an assessment coordinator who can ensure that the team’s 
efforts do not overlap assessments being conducted elsewhere or that are already completed 
for that area and/or cluster (IASC, 2015).  
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The purpose of the joint needs analysis is to compile the secondary and primary 
information that has been gathered and to translate the information into recognizable trends 
and actionable items. This step takes into consideration all the relevant observations, 
combines data to identify patterns and trends, and compares the information gathered on 
various social groups. Finally, MIRA culminates with the release of its report 
approximately two weeks into the disaster response. This report is tailored to various 
audiences with different formats and amounts of detail. The IASC MIRA guidance can 
provide more details on the MIRA process, illustrated in Figure 11, with further 
instructions, best practices, recommendations, and lessons learned. 
Figure 11. The MIRA Process. Source: IASC (2015). 
 
c. In-depth Assessments 
Demand for more detailed information and NA starts two weeks after a disaster 
strikes, if not sooner. In-depth assessments should be completed within the first 30 days of 
a disaster. In-depth assessments are mainly conducted in a joint fashion, orchestrated by 
the U.N. lead organization for each cluster. In-depth assessments inform the current 
humanitarian response effort with up-to-date trends and feedback on relief effectiveness. 
These assessments should include common informational metrics or “key indicators” in 
order to be compared across the various sectors. Key indicators can help inform the 
humanitarian community of the operation’s effectiveness. In-depth assessments should 
have a greater emphasis on primary data collection and quality of information. The 
information from in-depth assessments must be conglomerated on a shared database and 
updated as ongoing assessments take place (IASC, 2012). 
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d. Post-disaster Needs Assessment 
The Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) is conducted after the humanitarian 
relief operation has finished in the response phase and the threat of natural hazards has 
subsided. From this point, the PDNA takes approximately four weeks to complete. It is 
important that this assessment is still led by the host nation government, although other 
organizations such as the World Bank and U.N. OCHA may support the effort. This 
assessment focuses on gathering post-disaster damage assessments from all sectors with a 
division of focus on Damage and Loss Assessments (DALAs) and Human Recovery Needs 
Assessments (HRNAs) in each sector. DALA estimates damages to physical infrastructure, 
material goods, economic impact, trade flows, and so forth. HRNA estimates the disaster’s 
effects on social factors and human patterns of life. The HRNA may be broken down into 
units of individuals, households, or communities. A PDNA produces a recovery framework 
that presents the DALA and HRNA findings with short, medium, and long-term 
recommendations from each sector (Jones, 2010). 
e. Indicators 
These assessments should include common informational metrics or “key 
indicators” in order to be compared across the various sectors. Key indicators can help 
inform the humanitarian community of the operation’s effectiveness. Indicators can be 
thought of as variables that show a characteristic of the affected population or host nation 
that describe an aspect of the humanitarian mission. Indicators are designed for prolonged 
monitoring of the situation and should be linked back to early assessments or baseline data 
to measure the effectiveness of the relief effort. Good indicators can be consistently 
measured in a reliable manner, can accurately measure the condition intended, are specific, 
are sensitive to changes in the situation, can be feasibly collected, are intuitive, and are 
comparable across time. If indicators are unstable or inconsistent in each assessment, they 
could lead to misinformed decisions and possibly a failure of the humanitarian community 
to address a population’s needs (Garfield et al., 2011, pp. 6, 9–12). 
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f. Actors in a NA 
The most important actor in the conduct and management of NA is the host nation. 
Ideally, NA is led by the host nation government unless that entity is unable to do so. The 
host nation is best equipped to understand the needs of its people and must be given the 
opportunity to lead the NA effort (IASC, 2012). 
The Inter-Cluster Coordination Mechanism (ICCM) is arguably second in 
importance to the host nation. This ICCM is typically the coordinating body for assessment, 
although the ICCM may also decide to establish an Assessment and Information 
Management (AIM) working group (IASC, 2012). This organization, staffed by IASC 
personnel and cluster coordinators, is chaired by OCHA. The AIM working group may be 
established on a short- or long-term basis. The MIRA is normally designed, planned, and 
managed by the AIM working group. Furthermore, it helps coordinate and support 
assessment efforts across the different clusters throughout the relief effort. The AIM 
working group helps harmonize all assessments through the use of common operational 
datasets (CODs) and sharing results from needs assessments (IASC, 2012). 
The U.N. framework for an ICCM includes a humanitarian coordinator, cluster lead 
agency, and individual organizations (IASC, 2012). The humanitarian coordinator is 
responsible for the coordination of assessments throughout all the clusters. This person is 
supported by U.N. OCHA. The cluster lead agencies are responsible for conducting the 
assessments within their sectors. These lead agencies coordinate individual organizations’ 
assessments within the clusters to avoid, or at least reduce, duplication of efforts. These 
individual organizations include NGOs and the International Federation of the Red 
Cross/Red Crescent, and possibly foreign government agencies such as USAID or the 
DoD. Figure 12 illustrates the roles and responsibilities that each actor has in NA within 
the U.N. ICCM framework.  
 40 
Figure 12. Roles and Responsibilities of ICCM Actors. Source: IASC (2012). 
 
g. Principles of a NA 
Many of these foundational sources present a list of best practices and 
recommendations for the conduct of NA. For brevity, we have chosen to present the 
ACAPS 10 basic principles of an NA, as outlined in the ACAPS (2014) Humanitarian 
Needs Assessment: The Good Enough Guide, and elaborate on these 10 principles with 
inputs from other sources. The following are the ACAPS 10 basic principles:  
1. “Make the scope of the assessment reflect the size and nature of the crisis” 
(ACAPS, 2014, p. 3). An NA must cover all affected areas and sectors, but 
no more than what was affected by the actual disaster. Actors must 
understand that the population likely had needs before the disaster and 
providing aid beyond the scope of the disaster can become very time-
intensive and even undermine the population’s traditional coping 
mechanisms (ACAPS, 2014).  
2. “Produce timely and relevant analysis” (ACAPS, 2014, p. 3). Assessments 
immediately after a disaster must be linked to specific decisions that must 
be made in order to respond. Different organizations have different 
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information interests; therefore, it is best to collect and interpret data 
jointly rather than independently (IASC, 2012). A balance of quality, 
detail, and timeliness must be achieved in NA in order to be useful. Initial 
assessments should focus on quickly gaining information that is easily 
interpreted and applied rather than statistically significant (IASC, 2012).  
3. “Collect usable data” (ACAPS, 2014, p. 4). Information management 
personnel should help the assessment team collect information that can be 
linked to performance metrics. Information management personnel can 
also review the collection methods and ensure that data collected can be 
reliably compared to other assessments (IASC, 2012). Common 
Operational Datasets (CODs) help the various actors aggregate 
information. CODs are provided by OCHA and cover essential data 
including “humanitarian profile, population statistics, administrative 
boundaries, populated places, transportation network, hydrology and 
hypsography” (IASC, 2012, p. 7). 
4. “Use valid and transparent methods” (ACAPS, 2014, p. 6). Using 
standardized methods for data collection, such as those endorsed by the 
U.N., is best. Ensure that your collection methods and sources are 
annotated in any reports disseminated (ACAPS, 2014). 
5. “Be accountable” (ACAPS, 2014, p. 6). The affected population should be 
included in planning and aid implementation. These groups have the 
highest vested interest in the success of the operation and should be 
allowed a voice in the actions that affect their community. Actors in an 
NA are also accountable to each other. Actors should ensure that their 
results are cleared by the lead assessment team prior to dissemination. 
Likewise, a communication strategy must be established among the 
assessment team that allows for incremental communication to decision-
makers as information becomes available (IASC, 2012). 
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6. “Coordinate with others and share findings” (ACAPS, 2014, p. 6). Ensure 
that all other actors know that an assessment is being conducted and 
ideally, design and plan the assessment jointly as part of a coordinated 
needs assessment (IASC, 2012). 
7. “Make sure you can get enough resources” (ACAPS, 2014, p. 8). An 
effective assessment may take considerable logistics support and 
communications assets. Additionally, the assessment team must be 
tailored to the given situation with members trained in multi-sectoral 
assessments, the host nation culture, security, data collection methods, 
planning, ethics, humanitarian principles, and so on. (Garfield et al., 
2011). 
8. “Assess local capacities” (ACAPS, 2014, p. 8). NA teams must work to 
consider and measure the response of the host nation and humanitarian 
community to identify gaps in the response. Local capacities include all 
coping mechanisms that the host nation population is using to deal with 
the disaster’s affects. Vulnerable groups should be particularly engaged, 
including elderly, adolescent, sick, and diverse populations to ensure their 
needs are well understood. Ensure that assessment teams include a balance 
of both genders to communicate with all vulnerable groups (IASC, 2012). 
9. “Manage community expectations” (ACAPS, 2014, p. 9). NA teams must 
be careful not to promise results or aid to a population before proper 
planning has taken place. This expectation management extends to all 
stakeholders, such as the host nation government and other actors in the 
operation. Multiple visits to a location for assessments without aid results 
may cause impatience and distrust within the affected population. In all 
visits, assessment teams must be very sensitive to cultural norms (ACAPS, 
2014).  
10. “Remember that assessment is not just a one-off event” (ACAPS, 2014, p. 
9). Assessments must be continually conducted throughout the course of 
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an operation. The current situation is constantly changing, especially in 
large multi-national response efforts. Assessments increase in detail as the 
most pressing needs are met and more time is allowed for thorough 
assessments (ACAPS, 2014).  
3. Other Capabilities 
Though our research focuses on I/KM and NA, it is useful to gain an understanding 
of the remaining four essential capabilities. Supply includes the “process of providing 
materials and items used to equip, support, and maintain an organization” (USMC, 2000, 
p. 5-1). Activities related to supply include procurement, staging, inventory management, 
and warehousing (Apte et al., 2016). Both humanitarian and military organizations actively 
preposition assets and supplies strategically for HA/DR operations. One of the unique 
supply challenges for humanitarian organizations during an operation is to manage an 
overwhelming amount of donated supplies that are rarely standardized or tailored to the 
unique needs of the affected population.  
Deployment and distribution of assets is frequently a capability that the DoD is 
requested to provide. The DoD’s equipment—such as off-road heavy-lift vehicles, heavy-
lift helicopters, sealift, recovery assets, and inter-theater strategic airlift—are well suited 
for operating in areas with degraded infrastructure and for distributing supplies to remote 
locations. Humanitarian organizations typically rely on commercial contracts to move 
personnel and supplies when the DoD is not in support (Apte et al., 2016). Last mile 
distribution of supplies poses a challenge for HA/DR planners. Placing relief supplies into 
the hands of the affected population requires a robust capability and detailed management 
of supply routes that the military is uniquely suited to support.  
Health service support is a critical and immediate need for the affected population 
of a natural disaster. It is imperative that the humanitarian response can provide medical 
aid in a timely manner. Any military commander has the authority to employ his unit when 
lives are in immediate danger and the unit is able to intervene (Wilhelm, 2015). The OFDA 
mandate includes the activities of “saving lives, alleviating human suffering, and reducing 
the social and economic impact of disasters worldwide,” of which health services are 
 44 
critical (USAID, 2017a). Hospital ships, field hospitals, and surgical units are all medical 
capabilities of the DoD historically used to support HA/DR operation (Apte et al., 2016). 
NGOs, on the other hand, have historically provided general medical supplies and 
vaccinations in accordance with their organizations’ competencies (Apte et al., 2016).  
Collaboration and governance have proven very difficult in HA/DR operations. 
Collaboration among military, government, civilian, host nation, international agencies, 
and U.N. authorities can obviously become complex and confusing. The international 
community relief effort for the 2010 Haitian earthquake disaster included over 400 separate 
organizations (Allende & Anaya, 2010). Despite the common cause of providing aid, each 
one of these organizations has private interests, which are frequently given priority over 
the collective achievement (Allende & Anaya, 2010). Governance of these entities can 
originate from either the host nation or international authorities such as the U.N. OCHA. 
Consolidation of coordination centers has rarely been achieved well; in the 2015 Nepal 
earthquake disaster relief operation, there were five coordination centers in Kathmandu 
alone (Bollettino & Kreutzer, 2015). Unification of these governance efforts prevents 
duplication of labor and waste throughout the operation (Allende & Anaya, 2010).  
E. ACTORS 
There are numerous actors in an HA/DR operation. These actors often have little to 
no command and control over each other but frequently work in a collaborative 
environment. Actors generally share the common goal of restoring basic necessities back 
to the people and communities in which they are supporting. Common actors include inter-
governmental organizations, government aid agencies, the military, non-military 
organizations, host nation, media, and donors. 
1. Inter-governmental Organizations 
The U.N. is the primary and most influential of inter-governmental organizations 
operating in humanitarian operations. The U.N. OCHA is normally the lead entity in charge 
of coordination among the multitude of actors in the disaster’s theater (Allende & Anaya, 
2010). The U.N. utilizes the cluster approach, discussed earlier, to organize and channel 
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humanitarian efforts to decrease waste and maximize the international community’s 
capacity for aid (Tatham & Christopher, 2014).  
2. Government Aid Agencies 
USG agencies, principally USAID, lead the world in foreign humanitarian 
assistance. Government agencies like USAID have the advantage over their NGO 
counterparts of consistent and reliable funding. In 2005, OFDA’s budget was 
approximately $603.2 million, which is less than 5% of the total funding given to USAID. 
One of the most immediate and effective sources of support to nations affected by disaster 
by government agencies is emergency funding (Tatham & Christopher, 2014). These 
agencies are also instrumental in the coordination and communication among other entities 
from their nation.  
3. Military 
The military plays a significant role in providing support in response to a disaster. 
The two major contributors to the military’s successful role are the ever-present command 
and control structure and the fact that a “military mission normally dictates 
accomplishment despite the cost” (Apte, 2009, pp. 20–21). First, the military mission, 
combat or noncombat, always requires command and control. This competency is required 
at all levels of military operations and is nondiscriminatory to service components (Apte, 
2009). Secondly, the military mission is deemed the priority, and accomplishing the 
mission can only be achieved when funding is made available. Once a mission is assigned 
to a military unit, the funding of the mission is immediately allocated and reevaluated as 
necessary to accomplish the mission (Apte, 2009). 
Referring back to the previous definition, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) 
consists of “DoD activities, normally in support of USAID or Department of State (DoS), 
conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce 
human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation” (CJCS, 2014, p. GL-7). The USMC 
accomplishes its role in supporting humanitarian operations primarily through the 
employment of the MEU and/or a combination of other MAGTF elements. Through the 
MEU, the USMC has a litany of hard assets consisting of equipment and personnel, and 
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soft assets consisting of capabilities used to support humanitarian operations (Gastrock & 
Iturriaga, 2013). Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) detail the organization of the USMC in 
response to HA/DR operations as well as the litany of available assets.  
The USMC approaches HA/DR operations in a similar fashion to other operations 
within the range of military operations, using the tenets of the Marine Corps Planning 
Process (MCPP). The first step of the MCPP is problem framing. Problem framing is the 
most applicable step of MCPP to I/KM and NA competencies. The problem framing step 
defines the problem and mission through understanding and analysis of the environment, 
intelligence, capabilities, problem, purpose, and the commander’s initial intent and 
guidance (USMC, 2016). The USMC collaborates with the host nation (HN), nonmilitary 
organizations (NMOs), and other agencies in the Civil-Military Operations Center 
(CMOC) under the supervision of the Civil Military Operations officer (USMC, 2016). 
The scope of this research narrows the focus of the USMC hard and soft assets specifically 
to those of conducting I/KM and NA competencies.  
4. Nonmilitary Organizations 
In our research, we consolidate commercial and non-governmental organization 
(NGOs) into the single category of nonmilitary organizations (NMOs). NMO supply chains 
struggle to meet the demand during a disaster due to their inability to radically change their 
distribution networks (Apte, 2009). For instance, a commercial enterprise infrequently 
adjusts a distribution network and generally only does so to meet demand. This is a decision 
that takes time to both analyze and implement. In a disaster, time is crucial to providing an 
immediate and correct response. The flexibility and preparedness to adjust a distribution 
network is critical. 
5. Host Nation 
The host nation (HN) is the nation that is receiving support or assistance from 
partnered nations or other supporting organizations. All the efforts of the international 
community should be, but are not always, based on the needs of the HN and its specific 
requests for aid (Allende & Anaya 2010). The HN generally conducts an initial assessment 
of the outstanding needs and requirements, and requests international assistance (CJCS, 
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2014). The HN is responsible for the coordination of all relief operations within its 
territories. FHA is only conducted under the supervision and permission of the HN (CJCS, 
2014). Foreign aid agencies can only operate within the theater of the disaster after the HN 
has declared a state of emergency and requested international assistance (Cozzolino, 2012, 
p. 12).  
6. Media 
Due to the highly visible nature of sudden onset disasters, the international media 
community plays an active role. The coverage provided by the media can affect operations 
by providing a positive or negative view of the actors involved. Some organizations may 
actively seek out media coverage to garner support. Government and military entities have 
political interests at stake in the conduct of an HA/DR mission and as a result may alter 
their activities or communications efforts to gain media coverage (Allende & Anaya, 2010; 
HART, personal communication, September 26–29, 2017). 
7. Donors 
Donors are both suppliers to the humanitarian field and customers. Donors are 
customers because they are essentially paying for a service to be performed in exchange 
for their support (Apte, 2009). Donors are essential to humanitarian organizations but are 
also notoriously unpredictable. Donations of goods in response to a disaster are frequently 
unsuitable for the needs or culture of the affected population. Large quantities of non-
standardized goods (e.g., used clothing) or culturally inappropriate goods (e.g., pork 
products in a Middle Eastern country) add great complexity to the organization of relief 
efforts (HART, personal communication, September 26–29, 2017). 
F. READINESS METRICS 
A review of the literature reveals a vast amount of research on business 
performance metrics but little on the development of military readiness metrics. However, 
the term performance metrics used in business and the term readiness metrics in the 
military share a close definition. Performance metrics are designed to assess the ability to 
accomplish a task after the task is completed, whereas readiness metrics are designed to 
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assess the ability to accomplish a future task. For this research, the terms are so closely 
related that the principles of developing performance metrics for business are synonymous 
to the principles of developing readiness metrics for the military. Lord Kelvin, a famous 
mathematician, emphasized the importance of measuring progress when he said:  
When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in 
numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it … 
your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind. (As cited in Adams, 
Sarkis, & Liles, 1995, p. 24) 
Current literature finds that “the primary goal when developing a performance 
measurement system should be to ensure that the behavior induced by the system is 
supportive of strategy” (Adams et al., 1995, p. 24). Furthermore, according to Adams et 
al., (1995) “The ability of the performance measurement system to clearly communicate 
strategy throughout the organization is a critical factor in determining the business’s 
success” (p. 25). A wealth of literature points out that the development of performance 
metrics should be based on the primary activities and process of the organization, should 
be dynamic in response to future change, and should be developed in a team approach (as 
cited in Adams et al., 1995). 
In Apte’s 2017 work, she explains that many humanitarian organizations also lack 
solid readiness metrics. It is no surprise, then, that the DoD has also been slow to develop 
concrete metrics. The DoD’s efforts to execute stability operations in accordance with DoD 
Instruction (DODI) 3000.05 will be stifled until a comprehensive framework for readiness 
metrics is developed (Apte, 2017). Apte (2017) describes five inputs to readiness metrics 
that can be developed into a readiness assessment model: 
• Performance indicators 
• Core competencies and capabilities 
• Issues and challenges in humanitarian operations 
• Lessons learned from past disasters 
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• Communication, coordination, and collaboration among civil-military 
organizations 
An analysis of these inputs can help develop readiness metrics in the form of 
mission essential tasks (METs), equipment assessments, acceptable cost parameters for 
defined capabilities, training and experience, and lessons learned (Apte, 2017). This 
readiness assessment model, if informed with sufficient inputs and metrics, should provide 
HA/DR planners with a firm understanding of what is needed, what must be done, and how 
to improve performance for future operations (Apte, 2017).  
Figure 13 depicts a snapshot of the USMC process for developing and reporting 
readiness. In broad terms, the USMC uses its designated mission to determine its 
requirements, capabilities, structure, and resources. This translates into the Marine Corps 
tasks (MCTs), which are listed in the Marine Corps Task List (MCTL) in Marine Corps 
Order (MCO) 3500.26a, Universal Naval Task List (USMC, 2007). Headquarters Marine 
Corps (HQMC) generates METs for all organizations, installations, and Marine Corps 
Forces (MARFOR) organizational commands. Commanders are then responsible for the 
development of their own Mission Essential Task List (METL), which is approved by the 
higher command (USMC, 1996). Unit commanders use the METLs as a foundation for 
evaluating the unit’s readiness and developing training plans. Commanders then report 
their unit readiness using the Defense Readiness Reporting System–Marine Corps (DRRS-
MC) based on established standards and measures. The DRRS-MC serves as the feedback 
loop for reporting readiness to HQMC for meeting METs (USMC, 2011).  
We research strategic-level capabilities required of I/KM and NA core 
competencies to support humanitarian missions to facilitate analysis by USMC 
commanders of their ability to achieve readiness within the two core competencies. 
Although we do not plan to discuss the capabilities required by specific units or MAGTF 
elements, we believe that our research will guide USMC commanders in the selection of 
their METLs and ultimately improve the USMC ability to support HA/DR operations. 
Therefore, we believe our research may be used as a guide for the development and 
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assessment of current METLs to ensure that the USMC is training as efficiently and 
effectively as possible to support HA/DR missions well into the future. 
Figure 13. MCT/MET/METL Life Cycle. Source: USMC (2017). 
 
G. EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE TO DOD MEMBERS 
1. Joint Humanitarian Operations Course 
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is designated as the lead 
U.S. agency for coordination and support of foreign disaster assistance. USAID designates 
the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) as the responsible office to carry out 
this mission. OFDA conducts the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) on a 
regular basis to educate military members on the civil-military roles in international 
disaster response. The course is generally a two-day course with distinct key messages: 
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USAID/OFDA is the designated USG lead for foreign disaster response; 
when requested, DoD works in a supporting capacity to civilian relief 
agencies. 
The USG has a formal, comprehensive system for responding to 
international disasters; DoD is not an instrument of first resort in responding 
to humanitarian crises. 
There is a process and key tools for requesting and validating U.S. military 
support during disasters (ExecSec Memo, MITAM, 72-hour rule). 
If DoD support is requested, it must be due to a unique capability that they 
can provide (at an appropriate level). 
The United States is just one part of an organized, professional humanitarian 
system/architecture. 
The international humanitarian community responds to validated 
humanitarian needs on a pull not push system. 
Humanitarian principles and space are paramount to a successful response. 
(USAID, 2016, p. 6)  
The objective of the course is to educate DoD service members on HA/DR 
operations and the role of the DoD in providing disaster relief as well as interagency 
coordination and support. 
2. Humanitarian Assistance Response Training Course 
The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance 
(CFE-DMHA) is funded by the DoD under U.S. PACOM. The CFE-DMHA conducts the 
Humanitarian Assistance Response Training (HART) course. According to the CFE-
DMHA (n.d.) website,  
The HART course prepares United States military commanders and their 
staffs to respond more effectively during civilian-led humanitarian 
assistance and foreign disaster response missions. The four-day, 
operational-level course focuses on applying the military planning and 
decision-making process to the unique circumstances associated with a 
foreign humanitarian assistance operation. Participants will employ realistic 
scenarios and existing plans to develop a concept of operations for a joint 
task force response to a major disaster. Case studies, small group practical 
applications, and role-playing exercises enhance lectures by civilian and 
military experts. 
 52 
The HART course is not considered mandatory training according to any known 
DoD policies nor does it provide any sort of certification toward future or current military 
occupational specialties or positions. 
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III. ANALYSES 
The analysis consists of a case study analysis of each of the previously mentioned 
disasters followed by an analysis of interviews conducted with the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense for policy (OSD-P) and members of the Military Liaison Team at OFDA. 
A. CASE STUDIES 
In order to recommend a set of readiness metrics, each of the previously discussed 
disasters is analyzed independently. Both positive and negative characteristics of the DoD 
response are discussed. The negative characteristics are further analyzed to understand 
what the DoD can do better in support of future HA/DR missions. 
1. Haiti Earthquake 2010: Operation Unified Response  
Operation Unified Response represents one of the largest disasters to date in terms 
of number of deaths, displaced people, and economic damage. It also represents one of the 
longest responses in which the DoD provided disaster relief (DiOrio, 2010). These two 
facts combined make Haiti a unique case. However, the magnitude of the disaster and the 
length of the DoD response also provide many invaluable lessons from which to learn.  
a. Immediate Response 
The 2010 earthquake in Haiti resulted in damage and loss of life on a level 
incomparable to many of the disasters to date. U.S. SOUTHCOM had an established 
standard operating procedure (SOP) for disaster relief but failed to adhere to the SOP due 
to the “cataclysmic disaster” (Guha-Sapir, Kirsch, Dooling, Sirois, & DerSarkissian, 2011, 
p. 125) requiring a more “robust” response. The response requirement was further elevated 
due to security concerns and “an anticipated but yet-undefined (by USAID) requirement to 
support humanitarian assistance operations” (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011, p. 125). The decision 
to increase the response capability beyond the SOP resulted in the presence of a military 
force that was larger than required (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011).  
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Natural disasters all have similarities in relief demand, although no two disasters 
are the same. Therefore, the ability of the DoD and/or combatant commands to develop a 
structured SOP for disaster relief is challenging, but not impossible. This challenge is 
further complicated when a “cataclysmic disaster” (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011, p. 125) or 
mega disaster, such as the Haiti earthquake, occurs. A mega disaster disrupts an otherwise 
structured approach to a response. One major limitation in Haiti was that the SOP did not 
have the “agility, flexibility, and expediency” (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011, p. 125) built in to 
meet the demands required of a disaster of that magnitude. The problem was further 
complicated by the lack of early assessments in the face of immediate response. 
b. Early Assessments 
Due to his presence in the country and his subsequent assignment as the joint task 
force (JTF) commander, Lieutenant General Keen issued verbal orders of the commanding 
officer (VOCO) for U.S. SOUTHCOM support in the disaster relief process. The VOCO 
process ensured the rapid deployment of personnel and capabilities. However, this 
prevented situational awareness of many of the units and commanders responding to the 
VOCO compared to an otherwise formal assessment process. Additionally, VOCO resulted 
in many inefficiencies in that some relief supplies and assets far exceeded demand while 
others fell short (Cecchine et al., 2013). 
The DoD’s formal assessment process, utilizing a Humanitarian Assistance Survey 
Team (HAST), was not utilized in Operation Unified Response due to the magnitude of 
the disaster. Lieutenant General Keen, using his years of experience and in anticipation of 
future mission requirements, made a judgment call when requesting units for deployment 
to the area. His theory was to surge assets to Haiti for immediate relief, which resulted in 
effectiveness but not necessarily efficiency. The surge included units such as a team from 
the U.S. Air Force, Special Operations Wing, to re-establish flight operations by assuming 
control of the Air Traffic Control functions at the Port-au-Prince Airport. The team arrived 
just 26 hours after the earthquake and reinstated flight operations within 28 minutes after 
arrival (Cecchine et al., 2013). However, early judgment calls resulted in little to no 
measures of true effectiveness and a lack of efficiency (Cecchine et al., 2013). 
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The early response of the DoD included 1,000 pallets of bottled water, against the 
objections of certain experts (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011). With a lack of assessments prior to 
the response, many USG agencies, including the DoD, “pushed resources into Haiti in 
order to meet the unidentified needs in the field” (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011, p. 80). 
Additionally, many of the response efforts created the potential for unnecessary 
dependency. This example is evident in Haiti where pre-earthquake water production at the 
Port-au-Prince municipal water authority was approximately 80 to 90 million liters per day, 
and a month into the response the water production rose to approximately 120 to 150 
million liters per day (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011). The increased production was specifically 
attributed to the increased access to fuel provided by the relief efforts (Guha-Sapir et al., 
2011). The objective of humanitarian assistance is to return the affected state back to pre-
disaster conditions (JHOC, personal communication, September 18–19, 2017). Early 
assessments should have identified the pre-disaster conditions and established the post-
disaster threshold for relief support to avoid the potential dependency created by the 
increased water production. Therefore, early assessments are crucial to preventing 
unnecessary dependency, measuring effectiveness, and improving efficiency.  
c. Information Collection 
The Haiti earthquake presented a unique situation in which the USG response was 
unprecedented in comparison to previous disasters. The whole of government approach 
resulted in the involvement of many agencies and political leaders in the support of 
international disaster relief operations for the first time or with little previous experience. 
An increase in political involvement and interagency participation created information 
needs that at times “detracted from the on-ground response because of the need to 
constantly answer questions and chase down facts” (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011, p. 78). 
The U.S. Coast Guard was one of the first responders to conduct early assessments. 
They conducted rapid needs assessments of the structural damage to the Port-au-Prince 
airport and sea port through aerial surveys (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011). The assessments were 
completed within the first 48 hours after the quake. In the early weeks, needs assessments 
were extremely difficult to conduct due to the overwhelming infrastructure damage, 
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including inaccessible roads, non-operational communication lines, and very limited 
access to transportation. However, as the situation improved, assessments were conducted 
by multiple organizations including the USG, U.N., and NGOs. The U.S. military and 
OFDA DART conducted assessments on the ground with the U.S. military reporting 
findings back to U.S. SOUTHCOM and the OFDA DART to the USAID Response 
Management Team (RMT) in Washington (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011). 
Primary limitations to information management in the Haiti response circled around 
two main themes: “There were limited data available for tactical and operational decisions” 
and “there were overwhelming requests for data and information from policy leaders in 
Washington that made systematic data collection more difficult” (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011, 
p. 78).  
d. Information Management and Sharing 
U.S. SOUTHCOM made the early decision to utilize unclassified information 
systems to the fullest extent possible. This early decision greatly improved the ability to 
share information with the Government of Haiti (GOH), U.N., and NGOs (Guha-Sapir et 
al., 2011). The U.S. military utilized two primary portals to manage and share information: 
All Partners Access Network (APAN) and Intellipedia.  
APAN was utilized to store and share information externally with partners on the 
ground including the GOH, U.N., and NGOs. However, the major limitation of APAN for 
external information sharing is the requirement to register and request access to the 
information stored on APAN. The humanitarian community, following the principles of 
impartiality and independence, is concerned with registering on a DoD website where their 
actions are monitored and documented on the website (JHOC, personal communication, 
September 18–19, 2017). This requirement discourages not only their participation and 
willingness to share information on the site but also their access to information available 
on the site. Furthermore, APAN was often seen as “a dumping grounds for data” (Guha-
Sapir et al., 2011, p. 79), lessening its effectiveness. This suggests that significant attention 
is needed in the categorization, labeling, verification of validity, and organization of 
information stored on APAN. Additionally, many open source documents were editable by 
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a wide range of users, which discredited the accuracy and trustworthiness of the 
information stored on the site (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011). Guha-Sapir et al. (2011) suggested 
that “information managers and specialists should be assigned to manage these websites” 
(p. 80). 
Several agencies utilized Intellipedia to share information internally among the 
USG, including the DoS, USAID, Health and Human Services, DoD, Coast Guard, and 
others (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011). This site was underutilized during the Haiti response. 
However, the site served as “a good example of internal communication and successfully 
kept USG personnel within the Interagency apprised of the situation and news on the 
response” (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011, p. 80).  
JTF-H established a presence at the Humanitarian Aid Coordination Centers 
(HACC). The mission of the HACC, as identified by Cecchine et al. (2013), was to 
1. coordinate, synchronize, track and assess HA operations 
2. create and maintain a humanitarian common operational picture 
3. integrate with all stakeholders in order to develop prioritized lists of 
support requirements 
4. serve as the primary JTF interface with U.N., NGO, and interagency 
partners (p. 44) 
About half of the HACC members were located at the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-
Prince and the other half at the U.N. Logistics Base partnered with OCHA, U.N. 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), partner-nation militaries, and the 
international humanitarian community within the U.N. cluster system (Cecchine et al., 
2013, p. 44). Clusters of support agencies submitted requests for assistance (RFAs), 
validated by the U.N., detailing the identified needs to support an NGO in providing HA 
processed to the MINUSTAH Joint Operations and Tasking Center (JOTC). If 
MINUSTAH was unable to provide assistance and USAID/OFDA determined that military 
support was required, USAID/OFDA would then issue a mission tasking matrix (MITAM) 
to the JTF-H for execution (Cecchine et al., 2013).  
One major limitation was that JTF-Haiti received reports that the MITAM process 
was not responsive enough and therefore some NGOs bypassed the MITAM process in 
order to seek assistance faster (Cecchine et al., 2013). If or when the MITAM process is 
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bypassed, the DoD faces the potential of responding to unvalidated requests resulting in a 
lack of reimbursement through Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid 
(OHDACA) funding. Additionally, the DoD may commit to a request that is not actually 
required, or of a lower priority, therefore preventing itself from responding to an otherwise 
required request, or a request of a higher priority, as determined by the HN, U.N., and 
USAID. This is an example of the United States taking on excessive burden, beyond what 
is requested as a unique capability. 
2. Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 2011: Operation Tomodachi  
Unlike many countries stricken by previous disasters, Japan is a first world country 
with a strong economy, an established military with many of its own fixed and rotary wing 
assets, and capable authorities at the local and state level. This makes the Japan disaster 
case unique even without considering the large presence of U.S. military stationed in and 
around Japan. This unique case presented many challenges to Major General Mark 
Brilakis, Comanding General, 3d Marine Division, Joint Force Land Component 
Commander (JFLCC) (MCCLL, 2011). 
a. Pull versus Push Support 
According to the MCCLL (2011) report, “the relief mission was operationally 
straight forward: identify unique military capabilities that are needed, deploy and operate 
them; however, a primary operational challenge was in identifying what assistance the 
Japanese required” (p. 18). The 3d Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) had excess 
capacity to provide relief. However, the struggle was identifying what resources existed to 
meet the requirements demanded on the ground (MCCLL, 2011). Although III MEF 
deployed a HAST within the first 24 hours after the earthquake, the capabilities of the 
HAST were underutilized due to the restrictions placed on the Japan Self-Defense Force 
(JSDF) by Japanese civil authorities (MCCLL, 2011). The HAST was not fully utilized 
until approximately seven days after arrival. According to Major General Brilakis, “We 
[III MEF] ended up having to work hard to generate the requirements. … That inability to 
do what we do best, which is get in fast and start to operate very quickly, was very, very 
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limited in this operation and led to … frustrations, particularly on the United States’ side” 
(MCCLL, 2011, p. 18). 
The Government of Japan (GOJ) and the Japanese Self Defense Force maintained 
control of the relief efforts in Japan. In some cases, the JSDF demanded that it deliver the 
supplies to its own people while the United States was to deliver supplies to locations 
designated by the JSDF (MCCLL, 2011). Over time, the JFLCC staff role consisted of 
“taking taskings from the JSDF, identifying and prioritizing requirements for support, 
matching assets and equipment to each task and monitoring execution” (MCCLL, 2011, p. 
18). Overall, from a U.S. military perspective, the GOJ and civil authorities proved to be 
capable and competent in managing response efforts to the disaster. Therefore, as big as 
the disaster was in Japan, the requirements of U.S. support differed greatly from those of 
previous disasters (MCCLL, 2011). 
When analyzing the GOJ and the JSDF in disaster response, it is clear that the 
Japanese disaster presented the need for the U.S. military to find a balance between pushing 
and pulling relief. The GOJ and the JSDF were competent and capable of providing most 
of the relief in Japan. Additionally, Japan, as the host nation, insisted on staying in control 
of the response. Therefore, the U.S. approach to push support was generally ineffective and 
unwanted. One significant challenge for III MEF was having the patience to respond to 
requests, knowing that they could potentially provide more support. However, the support 
was provided “by, through, and with the host nation” (MCCLL, 2011, p. 19). In this case, 
the GOJ and the JSDF insisted largely on conducting their own needs assessments and 
determining their own gaps. Therefore, the most efficient and effective U.S. support for 
this operation was provided on a pull basis, responding to requests generated by the GOJ 
and the JSDF, vice attempting to push capabilities and assets.  
b. Information Collection 
Information collection in Japan was facilitated largely through the use of airborne 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. The GOJ was willing to grant 
access for the use of airborne ISR assets, far beyond that of other humanitarian response 
cases in the past (Moroney et al., 2013). U.S. military ISR assets were utilized to establish 
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greater situational awareness, as well as to share information with Japanese counterparts 
(Moroney et al., 2013).  
In the first 48 hours, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) launched an RQ-4 Global Hawk 
from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. It provided imagery of affected areas to inform 
damage assessments and aid the GOJ in determining “priorities in near-real time” 
(Moroney et al., 2013, p. 93). In addition to the Global Hawk, the USAF employed the 
South Korea-based U-2. The U-2 is a high altitude manned aircraft, which captured “high-
resolution, broad area-imagery of disaster-affected areas” (Moroney et al, 2013, p. 93). 
Additionally, the U.S. Navy employed the P-3 Orion maritime surveillance aircraft. The P-
3 Orion is a manned aircraft used to conduct aerial search missions. Crews of the Orion 
surveyed Japan’s northern coastline searching for survivors visually and utilizing surface-
search radar (Moroney et al., 2013). The crews reported information about water and port 
risks that could impede ships in support of the relief efforts (Moroney et al., 2013). 
According to Moroney et al. (2013), the U.S. DoD and Department of Energy 
played a significant role in assessing the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Power Plant. 
Together, they formed a U.S. interagency team of around 20 personnel that conducted data 
collection and analysis. However, this team provided little consensus in making 
recommendations due to the lack of USG standards and varying approaches utilized by the 
different agencies (Moroney et al., 2013). Although it is important that the U.S. military 
played a significant role in conducting assessments and information sharing associated with 
the nuclear disaster, the competency tends to fall more under the scope of Foreign 
Consequence Management rather than HA/DR. Therefore, we believe the nuclear disaster 
and the role of the DoD should be analyzed separately from HA/DR operations, as this was 
a situation unlike any other disaster. 
c. Assessments 
The JSDF played a primary role in delivering aid in response to the disaster in 
Japan. The established relationships and presence of the U.S. military in Japan make 
Operation Tomodachi unique. The JSDF depended heavily upon direct military-to-military 
relationships to provide relief. The combined presence and established relationships 
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facilitated a rapid response and a surge of relief to the GOJ and local populations. However, 
assessments and validation of relief requests were lacking in the U.S. response.  
In many cases, pushing relief resulted in redundancy, waste, and general 
inefficiencies. For example, at the request of the GOJ for “water,” one million bottles of 
water were provided (Moroney et al., 2011). Providing bottles of water as a relief supply 
is often viewed as a logistical burden that can prevented by choosing better alternatives for 
fresh water (JHOC, personal communication, September 18–19, 2017; HART, personal 
communication, September 26–29, 2017). Along with other examples, providing the 
excessive amount of bottled water was largely attributed to the “vagueness of the request” 
(Moroney et al., 2011, p. 98), as well as a lack of validation of the need. Other examples 
include the USMC deployment of a Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force 
(CBIRF), several unmanned aerial vehicles, and 26 different types of water pumps 
(Moroney et al., 2011). In the case of the USMC CBIRF, 100 personnel were deployed for 
30 days and were never requested or required (Moroney et al., 2011). Often, requests for 
assistance went from prefecture leaders to their known point of contact in the JSDF. The 
JSDF leader would then process the request to their known point of contact at the U.S. 
component command (Moroney et al., 2011). These requests lacked proper prioritization 
due to an absence of “metrics to make the determination of needs objective” (Moroney et 
al., 2011, p. 99). 
During Operation Tomodachi, the DoD struggled with coordination issues with 
respect to exit strategies. During the needs assessment process, it is important to use 
standardized metrics to determine the objective for assistance and transition. However, the 
different U.S. military components lacked standardization in metrics or thresholds for their 
exit strategies (Moroney et al., 2011). This resulted in the Japanese being uncertain of the 
extent of U.S. military support and of how much longer the U.S. military would be 
supporting the GOJ (Moroney et al., 2011). 
d. Information Sharing 
The U.S. embassy in Tokyo established a Bilateral Assistance Coordination Cell 
(BACC), which included all USG agencies. It was modeled after the USAID MITAM 
 62 
coordination system (Moroney et al., 2013). The BACC is thought to be similar in nature 
to the JOTC in Haiti or the HUMOCC in later cases. Additionally, a Bilateral Coordination 
Council (BCC) was established. The BCC included only U.S. and Japanese military 
officials and was established in three locations (Moroney et al., 2013). The BCC did not 
include any civilian agencies and is thought to be similar in nature to the HACC in Haiti 
or the MNCC in later cases. Three U.S. Army liaison officers (LNOs) and one USMC LNO 
were embedded with the JSDF and positioned at the BCC. LNOs were responsible for 
reporting information to senior authorities and answering questions (Moroney et al., 2013).  
One major limitation to information sharing and communication was APAN. The 
goal of U.S. military leadership was to conduct all planning over the unclassified system 
APAN (Moroney et al., 2013). According to Moroney et al. (2013), there were four major 
issues with this approach: 
1. “GOJ was not willing or even able to upload information considered For 
Official Use Only (FOUO) and/or proprietary to APAN, particularly in 
terms of the nuclear response” (p. 99). 
2. “APAN had not been incorporated into security cooperation exercises with 
the JSDF and, as a result, the GOJ was unfamiliar with it and even a little 
skeptical of its utility” (p. 100). 
3. “APAN is primarily a military system; civilian government organizations 
and NGOs did not have access” (p. 100). 
4. “Foreign disclosure and over-classification (i.e. using ‘no foreign 
nationals’ unnecessarily) was also reported as an issue” (p. 100). There 
was an insufficient number of “foreign disclosure experts at the various 
command locations throughout Japan” (p. 100). 
It is almost impossible to separate the issues experienced with information sharing 
without noting the complexity and confusion surrounding the U.S. military command and 
control structure established during Operation Tomodachi. On March 11, 2011, U.S. 
Pacific Command (U.S. PACOM) released a task order designating the commander, U.S. 
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Forces Japan (USFJ), as the supported operational commander to provide foreign 
humanitarian assistance to Japan. However, USFJ contained no operational planning 
capability. Subsequently, over the ensuing days and weeks, major command relationships 
were redesignated and assigned. Two separate Joint Task Forces (JTFs) were assigned: 
JTF-505 for phased evacuation of American citizens and designated foreign nationals, and 
Joint Support Force Japan (JTF-519) for HA/DR support. The two joint forces were, as the 
III MEF commander noted, “totally interconnected by politics, location, personnel and 
resources” (MCCLL, 2011, p. 10). In addition to these two, in the first week of April, a 
Consequence Management Support Force (CMSF) was formed as a third organization 
(MCCLL, 2011). The assignment and designation of separate task forces for missions so 
closely related to the response of the disaster “proved confusing and it was unclear who 
was really in charge” (Moroney et al., 2013, p. 92). 
3. Philippines Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) 2013: Operation Damayan 
At the outset of Operation Damayan, U.S. military planners knew that Filipino 
devastation was severe. MARFORPAC began preparing for an HA/DR mission, although 
the JTF was not established until November 16. What initial needs assessments could not 
yet confirm was that Typhoon Haiyan affected over 10% of the Filipino population and 
was the deadliest natural disaster on record in the Philippines (Lum & Margesson, 2014). 
This claim is substantial considering the average 2.5% loss of Filipino gross domestic 
product each year from natural disasters and $1.5 trillion economic loss from natural 
disasters in the 45 years leading up to Typhoon Haiyan (Jumamil-Mercado et al., 2015). In 
order to fill in these information gaps for decision making, numerous actions were taken. 
a. Needs Assessments 
Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P), located about 600 
miles south of the disaster zone, provided firsthand primary data observations to the JTF 
(Parker et al., 2015). The rapid delivery of information, hours after a disaster has struck, 
can be a great asset to military planners. Colonel Walter Anderson, the III MEF G4 and 
JTF-505 J-4, stated, “JSOTF-P was a force multiplier because they were already on the 
ground and gave us ground truth on assessments and what the requirements were” (Luckey, 
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2014, p. 12). In addition, on November 9, U.S. PACOM ordered III MEF to deploy a HAST 
to the Philippines (Luckey, 2014). This HAST linked up with USAID DART personnel 
who were already on the ground on November 8. This particular DART team included 
USMC Major William Soucie, who was on the OFDA staff as a national fellow to 
USAID/OFDA. Major Soucie deployed to U.S. PACOM headquarters in JBPHH, HI, 
where he assisted with the development of the U.S. PACOM execution order (Luckey, 
2014). Such integration between the USMC and USAID/OFDA for future operational 
planning should be encouraged to deconflict the two organizations’ efforts. 
On November 10, the OFDA DART reached Tacloban, Cebu, and other areas to 
conduct needs assessments (Luckey, 2014). USAID/OFDA was not acting alone in 
assessments; three U.N. disaster assessment and coordination (UNDAC) teams also 
deployed to conduct initial rapid assessments (CFE-DMHA, 2014). Thanks to modern 
meteorological forecasting, the international community had a few days to prepare for the 
effects of Typhoon Haiyan. As a result, initial assessments were ready quickly. The host 
nation had provincial reports released as early as November 9 (U.N. OCHA, n.d.). NGOs 
such as Save the Children, Telecoms Sans Frontieres, Catholic Relief Services, and several 
others had completed initial assessments between November 10 and 15. The first 
assessments from these sources and others informed USG priorities, funding requirements, 
and the identification of unique DoD capabilities required to enable international relief in 
the Philippines (Luckey, 2014).  
Overall, 50 organizations uploaded hundreds of assessment reports to the official 
assessment registry on www.humanitarianresponse.info. The first UNDAC report was not 
released until December 2, 2013, while the U.N. OCHA MIRA report was released on 
November 29 (U.N. OCHA, n.d.). HA/DR planners must be willing to make decisions 
based off information from a myriad of organizations in the initial hours after a disaster. 
b. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
During the first week of operations, a focus was placed on conducting intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) with several non-traditional methods (Luckey, 
2014). Targeted information for ISR activities included road conditions, airports, seaports, 
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landing zones, and identification of distressed persons (Luckey, 2014). Military aircraft 
lifted DART members throughout the AO to conduct assessments (Parker et al., 2015). 
Pilot debriefings after each sortie added to situational awareness (Luckey, 2014). 
Counterintelligence and human-intelligence debriefed military personnel as well as 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) for information on potential threats, security concerns, 
and key leaders, and also to gauge the effectiveness of relief efforts (Luckey, 2014). 
Counterintelligence partnered with civil affairs teams to ascertain similar information from 
the population and victims. Overall, the JTF collected and processed over 900 images 
during Operation Damayan (Luckey, 2014). Despite the effectiveness of these ISR 
collection methods, aiding the assessment process with ISR was noted as one of the key 
shortfalls of JTF-505.  
The JTF-505 commander’s guidance included the importance of information 
sharing and maintaining products at an unclassified level as much as possible (Luckey, 
2014). JTF-505 largely adhered to this guidance even though ISR products were 
disseminated over exclusive means such as APAN, SharePoint, and email distribution lists 
rather than being posted to well-trafficked web portals such as Relief Web or 
www.humanitarianresponse.info. As a result, many organizations still felt isolated from 
U.S. military resources (CFE-DMHA, 2014). Some organizations, such as the Philippine 
Red Cross and World Bank, resorted to the use of low-cost drones for rapid assessments 
when satellite imagery or other ISR products were not available (CFE-DMHA, 2014).  
Directly engaging victims for the purpose of primary data collection, as conducted 
by the civil affairs and counterintelligence teams, is beyond the scope of unique U.S. 
military capabilities (S. Catlin, personal communication, August 24, 2017).3 In addition to 
this, there are several reasons that military actors should avoid such personal interaction 
with victims for the purpose of determining needs. In the conduct of needs assessments, 
humanitarian organizations coordinate to ensure that certain victim populations are not 
over surveyed (ACAPS, 2014). Public discontent can occur if victims are approached by 
numerous organizations claiming to provide aid without seeing desired results in their 
                                                 
3 This information comes from an interview with Steve Catlin, USAID/OFDA, and the authors of this 
report. 
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community. Humanitarian organizations carefully analyze which questions are asked and 
to whom they are asked in an attempt to gather necessary information that can inform 
decisions without overlapping efforts and creating such discontentment. The U.S. military, 
though experienced in similar types of data collection, does not receive ample training for 
the HA/DR operating environment. Furthermore, humanitarian organizations wish to 
maintain the perception of neutrality and operational independence when directly engaging 
victims for NA (CJCS, 2014; U.N., n.d.). Uniformed military personnel, acting unilaterally 
on behalf of the humanitarian community, can damage this perception of neutrality and 
operational independence (HART, personal communication, September 26–29, 2017). 
Readers may better understand this concept by imagining uniformed, foreign military 
intelligence-gathering activities in the midst of the 2017 Houston or Florida relief efforts. 
c. Secondary Data Collection 
Various after action reports describe the secondary data collection throughout the 
operation as sufficient. The JTF deployed with all-source analysts, meteorological and 
oceanographic (METOC) capabilities, topographic capabilities, and imagery analysis 
capabilities (Luckey, 2014). Imagery collection, as already stated, used methods such as 
airborne ISR and satellite imagery (CFE-DMHA, 2014). These capabilities form a well-
rounded secondary data collection effort when well managed. Secondary data collection 
such as this should be used by JTF planners to answer requests for information (RFIs), to 
maintain a common operational picture, and to monitor needs or capacity of the affected 
area. Dissemination of this information to other actors over information-sharing platforms 
can greatly benefit the relief effort. 
d. Information Sharing 
JTF-505 utilized multiple platforms to share information. Situation reports and ISR 
products were distributed mainly using APAN, SharePoint, and email distribution lists 
(Luckey, 2014). The Pacific Disaster Center’s DisasterAWARE Powered Emergency 
Operations provided hazard information, impact models, and assessment data to both JTF-
505 and any other interested actors (CFE-DMHA, 2014; Pacific Disaster Center, n.d.). JTF-
505 utilized APAN as a means of unclassified information sharing, with Intelink as the 
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repository site for products before being posted on APAN (Luckey, 2014). Unfortunately, 
early in the operation, the use of APAN was restricted by the lack of bandwidth (CFE-
DMHA, 2014). Once APAN access improved, JTF staff reported much higher quality 
communication with the armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) center at Camp Aguinaldo 
(Luckey, 2014). The AFP even continued to use APAN as a means of communication and 
information sharing after the JTF officially stood down (Luckey, 2014). It is important to 
remember that APAN and SharePoint restrict access to those individuals with common 
access cards or passwords assigned by the unit administrator. As a result, many 
humanitarian organizations do not attempt access to APAN. The author’s personal 
experience was that it only took 24 hours to receive a password to APAN. However, 
humanitarians frequently do not even attempt APAN access because of the availability of 
so much data elsewhere in U.N. web portals, including Relief Web and 
www.humanitarianresponse.info. In order to mitigate this, HA/DR planners can make DoD 
reports available via these U.N. web portals, effectively manage APAN account requests, 
and publicize JTF information management protocols at coordination centers early in the 
operation. 
e. Coordination Centers 
The JTF-505 operations center was located on the AFP’s Villamor Air Base in 
Manila. The multinational military coordination center (MNCC) and the national disaster 
risk reduction and management council (NDRRMC) were all collocated on Camp 
Aguinaldo in Manila (Parker et al., 2015). As a result, central coordination of the relief 
efforts all took place in Manila. This is not ideal since Manila was not one of the severely 
affected areas and is located on the island of Luzon, geographically separated from the 
disaster-stricken areas (Parker et al., 2015). This isolation presented the opportunity for 
low situational awareness among planners located in Manila. The JTF commander made 
the decision to establish headquarters in Manila to minimize negative impacts on the 
disaster-affected area (Luckey, 2014). The MNCC was not established for several days, 
which caused a degraded common operational picture among all foreign militaries in the 
early days of the disaster (Jumamil-Mercado et al., 2015). Nevertheless, the MNCC served 
as a focal point of coordination, information sharing, and prioritization of military relief 
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missions (Parker et al., 2015). Once operational, the MNCC’s relatively close proximity to 
JTF headquarters allowed for close coordination with AFP and other foreign militaries. 
JTF liaison officers were placed in the MNCC, U.S. embassy, USAID DART, U.N. 
centers, and NGO cluster meetings. The JTF also hosted liaison officers from 
USAID/OFDA in the main and forward headquarters. Of all these positions, Lieutenant 
General Wissler, the JTF-505 commanding general, viewed the MNCC position as most 
important. Lieutenant General Wissler’s deputy commander, an Army major general, 
attended the MNCC synchronization meetings every night. Lieutenant General Wissler 
stated, “Liaison officers are critical. Having the right liaison officers, the right grade, the 
right structure, and the right location in those organizations having impact on the operation 
is critical” (Luckey, 2014, p. 26). At a combatant command level, which this research is 
not focused on, U.S. PACOM established an international coordination team as an 
“enabling mechanism for the effective and speedy provision of military capabilities and 
resources to support international efforts in the U.S. PACOM AOR,” which met in Camp 
Smith, HI (Parker et al., 2015, p. 9).  
f. Challenges 
A standout hindrance on JTF information management was the limited available 
bandwidth (Luckey, 2014). Tactical communications networks originally brought into the 
ROP were designed for a limited number of users such as the Deployable Joint Command 
and Control (DJC2), which supports 60 users. These tactical network capacities proved 
insufficient when the JTF was established and the staff enlarged (Luckey, 2014). 
Furthermore, tactical networks prevented access to key websites such as ReliefWeb and 
the NDRRMC website. Users even reported having problems accessing APAN and 
SharePoint portals from the tactical networks (Luckey, 2014). Other criticisms of the 
tactical networks were that it was “too slow, unreliable, and create[d] an unnecessarily 
large footprint for HA/DR missions” (Luckey, 2014, p. 35). In order to mitigate this friction 
point, a commercial “Next Generation Enterprise Network” was established for 
unclassified use (Luckey, 2014, p. 35). Even though establishment of this network required 
communication with support personnel located within the continental United States, it 
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provided the necessary increase in bandwidth and unclassified access (Luckey, 2014). 
Similar use of commercial capabilities was evidenced in the 2015 Nepal response. Access 
to unclassified sources and foreign sites is necessary in a HA/DR operation to realize 
mature information-sharing practices (CFE-DMHA, 2014). 
4. Nepal Earthquake 2015: Operation Sahayogi Haat 
The 7.8 magnitude earthquake on April 25, 2015, immediately gained the attention 
of international humanitarian organizations. Although the number of casualties and 
damage in Nepal did not exceed the other case studies covered in this research, initial 
estimates projected a much higher level of devastation. Humanitarians did know aid would 
have to be delivered to very remote mountainous locations and immediately sought more 
information to tailor relief efforts. 
a. Initial Assessments 
Initial assessments often start with very simple forms of communication. After the 
earthquake in Nepal, the first DoD personnel to provide primary assessment data were 26 
Army Green Berets in U.S. Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) 1121 
who were already in the AO. Hours after the disaster struck, these ODA members traversed 
Kathmandu on foot and reported damage on critical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, 
and hospitals. The ODA initial assessments also included information on human suffering 
and displaced persons (Elwood, 2016). 
b. Joint Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team 
The Joint Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (JHAST) arrived in Nepal on 
April 30. Brigadier General Paul Kennedy led the JHAST, comprised of 22 personnel. This 
team’s task was to liaise with the OFDA DART and advise on unique DoD capabilities 
that could aid the international response. The U.S. PACOM warning order to the 
commander of Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) included tasks to “establish a joint 
assessment team” and “conduct humanitarian assessment survey operations … in support 
of USAID/OFDA” (Troutman, 2016, p. 12). Following official authorization to provide 
support on April 28, the JHAST deployed within 24 hours (Troutman, 2016). The JHAST 
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supplied information to U.S. PACOM staff, short of a full assessment report, which led to 
the creation of JTF-505 (Troutman, 2016). Further actions of the JHAST included liaison 
with the U.S. embassy, establishing a close relationship and consistent communication with 
the DART team leader (Troutman, 2015b; Troutman, 2016). 
One key limitation of the HAST was a lack of meteorological and oceanographic 
(METOC) representation. Without a METOC representative, the HAST team could not 
identify the lack of host nation METOC capability and failed to deploy any DoD METOC 
capabilities throughout Operation Sahayogi Haat. JTF-505 was still able to receive 
forecasts on weather from satellite data but was unable to verify these forecasts with any 
sensors on the ground. Some sectors in Nepal had no host nation sensor capabilities to 
verify satellite data, which was frequently off base due to Nepal’s many micro-climates 
(Troutman, 2015a). 
c. Use of Nontraditional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance  
JTF-505 utilized non-traditional ISR (NTISR) collection methods over traditional 
ones. The unique meteorological and political environment of Nepal prevented the use of 
most theater-level capabilities. NTISR methods employed included attaching a combat 
camera detail to each sortie in 1st Marine Air Wing (Troutman, 2015a; Troutman, 2016). 
MAGTF Secondary Imagery Dissemination Systems (MSIDSs) were also used to capture 
and transfer photos. JTF-505 had three MSIDSs available for Operation Sahayogi Haat 
(Troutman, 2015a; Troutman, 2016). MSIDSs are digital imagery technology designed to 
transmit imagery back to a MAGTF commander in near real time. Combat camera and 
MSIDS combined to form a capable NTISR capability (USMC Concepts and Programs, 
2017). Information gathered from NTISR were collected into post-mission reports and 
posted on APAN for other organizations to utilize (Troutman, 2015a).  
d. Collection of Information 
In addition to NTISR, JTF-505 collected information from open sources. JTF-505 
gathered service members from military occupational specialties including 0241, 
topographic and imagery interpretation specialists; 0261, topographic analysts; and 0231, 
intelligence specialists from 3d Intel Battalion and throughout III MEF. 0231s were 
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repurposed as Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) analysts. These OSINT analysts, along 
with other Marine Corps intelligence activities, drew information from the internet and 
social media on topics such as road conditions, availability of electricity, presence of 
camps, displaced persons, and popular reaction to disaster aid. These open sources, of 
course, had very little information on Nepal’s most remote areas, which had to be covered 
with NTISR. Other open sources included websites used by the U.N. and NGOs (Troutman, 
2015a). 
One key limitation of JTF-505 data collection was a lack of linguists. Without 
linguist capabilities, many open sources could not be analyzed. A second key limitation of 
information collection was security protocols of Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), 
which prevented access to many foreign sites that would contain useful open source 
information. A third limitation of JTF-505 information collection efforts was the lack of 
open source, data collection capabilities of 0231 intelligence specialists. After repurposed 
for OSINT, it became clear that 0231s did not have the training, tools, or skills necessary 
for such a rapid operation with widespread information sources (Troutman, 2015a; 
Troutman, 2016). 
e. Dissemination of Information 
JTF-505 posted a daily unclassified information summary (Troutman, 2015a; 
Troutman, 2016). The purpose of this information summary was to create a common 
understanding among all actors. Information was broken down by sector and district and 
included a summary of collections, meteorological impacts, and useful graphics from the 
U.N. or USAID. This summary was disseminated on APAN, the JTF-505 Intel Link 
website, and to an email distribution list (Troutman, 2015a). Other interviews from JTF 
staff indicated that APAN was used only sparingly, such as the III MEF information 
management officer who said “APAN … was not used much inside the JTF-505. Most of 
our information sharing was done on SharePoint” (Troutman, 2016, p. 32). JTF-505 also 
made use of Google Earth as a fall-back system for creating a common operational picture. 
Google Earth was used partially because in order to distribute unclassified products, these 
products had to be made with unclassified systems. JTF-505 also used the topographic 
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production capability and the tactical exploitation group, but Google Earth was described 
by the III MEF G-2 as “the most responsive C2 application available” (Troutman, 2015a, 
p. 6). Google Earth files were created and disseminated with details such as “boundaries, 
terrain features, IDP [internally displaced persons] counts, … landslides, road closures, 
relief deliveries, etc.” (Troutman, 2015a, p. 6). Throughout the course of Operation 
Sahayogi Haat, over 800 intelligence products were created and shared (Troutman, 2015a). 
An example information summary from Operation Damayan is listed in Appendix A. 
One key limitation to information sharing was the lack of non-secure internet 
protocol router (NIPR) assets and bandwidth available to JTF-505 (Anderson, 2015). In 
order to deal with the rapid influx of NIPR users, a tactical NIPR network was set up using 
non-garrison assets. Having two networks that could not interface caused issues with 
version control of products and sharing information, even between JTF personnel. 
Expeditionary Command and Control Suite (ECCS) and Deployable Joint Command and 
Control (DJC2) are two communications capabilities used by JTF-505 that received 
criticism for their inability to scale to a larger staff size as Operation Sahayogi Haat 
progressed (Troutman, 2016). A universal needs statement (UNS) for “increased capability 
of the ECCS” was originated by III MEF and endorsed by MARFORPAC, but the authors 
are unaware of this UNS’s current status (Troutman, 2016, p. 30). From a readiness 
perspective, neither these assets, nor any others used to establish the JTF-505 network, are 
considered mission essential according to the Marine Automated Readiness Evaluation 
System, which means the Marine Corp’s ability to command and control in HA/DR 
operations is not well measured by the Defense Readiness Reporting System (Troutman, 
2016). 
f. Coordination Centers 
JTF-505 integrated with the multinational military coordination center (MNMCC) 
with liaison officers who attended daily meetings and coordinated JTF operations with 
other actors in the AO (“Interview with U.S. Marine Corps Brig.,” 2016; Troutman, 2016). 
The MNMCC was collocated with the Nepal Army Headquarters and included a 
humanitarian-military coordination center (HuMOCC; Khari, 2016; Troutman, 2016). The 
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meetings at the MNMCC were lightly attended, at best, by the other two large foreign 
military actors—China and India (Anderson, 2015). Despite the lack of Chinese and Indian 
representation, the United States remained active and consistent participants in all 
MNMCC meetings. Nepalese military officers also attended JTF-505 meetings at the U.S. 
embassy as liaisons (Troutman, 2016). Liaison officers were also exchanged with the U.N. 
logistics cluster lead, World Food Program, with the oversight of USAID DART members 
(“Interview with U.S. Marine Corps Brig.,” 2016). These interagency coordination efforts 
and networks were essential to ensuring seamless operations and information exchange 
between the JTF, USAID, government of Nepal, U.N., other foreign militaries, and NGOs 
(Sanderson & Ramalingam, 2015; Troutman, 2016).  
g. Class A Mishap 
In the aftermath of a 7.3 magnitude aftershock on May 12, a UH-1Y Venom, call 
sign “Vengeance 01,” delivered relief supplies to Charikot (III MEF PAO, 2015; Troutman, 
2016). After delivering the supplies at Charikot, five Nepalese casualties were taken aboard 
Vengeance 01 for evacuation to a medical treatment facility. Tragically, the helicopter 
crashed during the return flight, resulting in the death of six Marines, two Nepalese military 
members, and the five Nepalese civilians (Troutman, 2016). According to the results of the 
command investigation, the Class A mishap most likely occurred as a result of 
unpredictable weather patterns along an unplanned and unfamiliar route selected by the 
pilots in order to reach medical assistance as soon as possible (III MEF PAO, 2015). The 
heroic actions of these individuals and the tragic nature of this mishap cannot be overstated. 
Lessons to be learned from this tragedy about the conduct of humanitarian 
assistance include the solemn reminder to properly conduct needs assessments (NAs) and 
information and knowledge management (I/KM). When the USMC is called to save lives 
and alleviate human suffering, unbridled ambition may dangerously tempt planners to 
ignore best practices or established doctrine related to the delivery of relief. The delivery 
of aid by Vengeance 1 was not a planned mission, launched in the immediate and chaotic 
aftermath of an earthquake without extensive route reconnaissance. The complex 
environment and heavy burden of HA/DR operations can stress the capabilities of even 
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experienced military professionals with the best equipment. Examples of the United States 
taking on excessive burden beyond what is requested as a unique capability can be found 
in every case study conducted in this research. Political, media, public, and moral pressures 
encourage a swift reaction with as much lifesaving capabilities as the responder can bring 
to bear. However, it is important to remember that the military response is a supporting 
effort to USAID, which must complement its response plan as the main effort. By allowing 
time for the host nation, USAID, and international community to assess and verify priority 
needs and gaps in capabilities, the military response can avoid overburdening its force or 
creating a dependency on U.S. military capabilities (S. Catlin, personal communication, 
August 24, 2017). 
B. INTERVIEWS WITH USAID/OFDA AND UNDER SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
In addition to the case studies, our analysis included interviews conducted with 
members of the Military Liaison Team with OFDA and the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy (OSD-P), Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Stability, and 
Humanitarian Affairs department. The analysis includes a summary of the most relevant 
topics introduced during these interviews along with areas of focus for improvement with 
respect to future disaster responses and preparation. 
1. Disaster Assistance Response Team and Humanitarian Assistance 
Survey Team Collaboration 
I/KM and NA capabilities, brought by the OFDA disaster assistance response team 
(DART) are often very limited. The OFDA DART rarely conducts independent needs 
assessments but may gather limited information from an area of interest. DART members 
partially rely on word of mouth in the earliest days after a disaster to determine the needs 
of the host nation. OFDA members, as well as the DoD, can request imagery from the 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency as a form of data collection. Even after receiving 
images, analytical efforts may appear quite modest compared to USMC intelligence 
standards. Supplementing DART efforts with thorough imagery and data analysis is a very 
beneficial way for the USMC to impact relief efforts in the earliest days after a disaster. In 
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addition to NA capabilities, each DART will deploy with an information officer who 
collates, packages, and distributes information. Guidance from individuals should inform 
DoD information management practices for the operation (L. Miani & R. Christ, personal 
communication, September 14, 2017)4. 
Humanitarian needs assessments take considerable training and knowledge to be 
conducted correctly. The Marine Corps, or any other DoD organization, does not officially 
conduct needs assessments post disaster. Even humanitarian assistance survey teams 
(HASTs) are only asked to assess what support the DoD can provide to the USG response 
in the specific context at hand. The role of the USMC in NA is to support other agencies’ 
assessment activities, share information with other agencies, advise on DoD capabilities, 
and inform relief efforts with information from external assessments (S. Catlin, personal 
communication, August 24, 2017). 
The DoD shares a unique relationship with foreign militaries around the world. Just 
as OFDA is often thoroughly knowledgeable about the host nation’s disaster management 
agency and the HOs in an affected area, the combatant command staffs are often 
knowledgeable about the militaries and share a unique, pre-established relationship. 
Therefore, the DoD could support the DART with staff members capable of enhancing the 
DART’s ability to conduct assessments (J. Solomon, personal communication, September 
15, 2017)5. 
OFDA regularly focuses much effort to ensure needs are met without the 
requirement for DoD assistance. Therefore, DoD support to the DART during the early 
assessment process has the potential to influence early decisions and create a need for DoD 
assistance when it otherwise may not have been required or requested. According to the 
Oslo guidelines, the military is a last resort; therefore, the DoD should only supplement the 
OFDA DART when a JTF-sized response is anticipated. Even in the case of intelligence 
                                                 
4 This information comes from an interview with Lino Mianai and Ryan Christ, USAID/OFDA; and 
the authors of this report. 
5 This information comes from an interview with Jobe Solomon, OSD-P; and the authors of this report. 
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analysis to support a JTF-sized humanitarian response, the requirement should be validated 
by the DART through the MITAM process. 
2. Information Sharing 
I/KM in humanitarian settings must include a shift in focus from information 
protection to information sharing (J. Solomon, personal communication, September 15, 
2017). Low technology options such as internet service providers within the host nation, 
cellphones, and email should be considered for permissive settings. By utilizing such 
options, communication suites can be set up quickly, facilitating rapid growth of a 
command staff as well as enhancing collaboration with partner nations. In the past, 
MITAMs have been passed from USAID to the DoD by simply passing a USB drive back 
and forth. By avoiding reliance on complex C2 suites, the USMC can decrease its footprint 
on the host nation and possibly even improve information collection efforts.  
Improvements will also come about by adapting to the information platforms that 
partner agencies have adopted. The U.N. uses Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination 
Center (OSOCC), the DoD uses APAN, OFDA uses multiple systems, Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) uses Virtual OSOCC and the OPERA information 
system, and so forth. There is no mandate for or control over the system that each agency 
chooses to use (J. Solomon, personal communication, September 15, 2017). Expecting the 
greater community to utilize APAN is proving to be challenging at best, and in many cases, 
external participation is relatively nonexistent. In order to engage in the dynamic 
environment of information sharing of future disasters, the DoD must be familiar with the 
most commonly used systems and be prepared to openly share information with the greater 
community. Many of these agencies participate in dozens of relief efforts every year 
without the DoD present; it should not be expected that they would change their I/KM 
practices on the rare occasions when they are in the DoD’s presence. Similar expectations, 
such as requiring clearances or common access cards for JTF meetings, will only hinder 
partnerships in a humanitarian operation (J. Solomon, personal communication, September 
15, 2017; S. Catlin, personal communication, August 24, 2017). 
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3. Humanitarian Perspective 
A distinct difference exists between the humanitarian perspective and the 
perspective of military members operating in HA/DR. Many of these differences have 
already been discussed, beginning with core humanitarian principles. Many capabilities 
that the USMC can bring to the table may not be favorably received by HA partners 
desiring to avoid a militarized persona. Such capabilities may include unmanned aerial 
vehicles, amphibious transportation, or even the use of APAN. The military mindset, on 
the other hand, frequently sees all useful capabilities as desirable. DoD planners enter into 
HA/DR operations with a desire to take on as much operational weight as possible, not 
realizing that they are in fact a supporting unit and considered a last resort in the Oslo 
guidelines. The DoD must realize that pre-conceived plans and SOPs developed may not 
fit perfectly into a specific disaster response and these plans must remain flexible and 
scalable. Such decisions will be made without perfect information. The chaotic setting of 
HA/DR operations prevents reliance on complete information. The military will never be 
considered a “humanitarian organization” but should strive to adapt its perspective and 
practices to better fit into an international relief effort (L. Miani & R. Christ, personal 
communication, September 14, 2017). 
4. Direct Contact with Clusters 
Most humanitarian organizations (HOs) are generally rooted in principles, such as 
neutrality, which deter and/or prevent direct interaction with the military. At times the 
principles may even push against direct contact with USAID/OFDA. However, 
USAID/OFDA is seen as a donor to many of these organizations, often providing the 
funding needed to carry out their missions. Likewise, if the HO absolutely needs military 
support such as airlift, it may coordinate directly with the military (J. Solomon, personal 
communication, September 15, 2017). However, the military must understand the 
humanitarian principles and respect the HO’s decision and/or opinion on direct contact. In 
some cases, HOs like the World Food Program (WFP) have been more open to working 
with the military due to the common need to support the logistical requirements of the 
disaster. 
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5. Coordination with NMOs 
In Damayan, requirements were not generated through the military coordinating 
with NGOs. The requirements were generated from OFDA attending meetings with the 
DoD, often in secured spaces. The DoD often did not invite NGOs. OFDA would attend 
the meetings and present validated requirements for missions. Coordination between the 
DoD and NGOs would then happen afterward. Often this was on the flight line with WFP 
or direct coordination tactically with other organizations (J. Solomon, personal 
communication, September 15, 2017). 
The HUMOCC has been in place since Damayan. However, the C was changed 
from center to concept. This is primarily because “it has not gotten traction” (J. Solomon, 
personal communication, September 15, 2017). The HUMOCC concept came after the 
“Haiti experience of having everyone collocated in one place,” which was referred to as 
the HACC (J. Solomon, personal communication, September 15, 2017). However, this 
creates almost a trading floor where civilians identify needs and capabilities to fill gaps, 
which often falls to the military. Requests are then generated directly to the military without 
proper vetting by OFDA. In the case of foreign partners who have less structure in their 
foreign support process, the HUMOCC may be good to increase the civilian/ military 
coordination. In the example of the United States, though, LNOs may be better with 
primary representation coming from OFDA (J. Solomon, personal communication, 
September 15, 2017). However, the HUMOCC “concept” is “actually in line with 
international best practices” for civilian/military coordination (J. Solomon, personal 
communication, September 15, 2017). 
6. Training and Education 
Current DoD education in the HA/DR field consists of the Joint Humanitarian 
Operations Course (JHOC) provided by OFDA. However, the course is not mandatory, no 
certification is achieved from the course, and little visibility is placed on the course from a 
DoD perspective. The JHOC course is presented more in a fashion of strategic messaging 
to the DoD. The JHOC is presented as a course to teach what the DoD should and should 
not be doing. However, the DoD should institutionalize this role and be teaching its own 
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members what they should and should not be doing. As is, the DoD is relying on another 
government agency, OFDA, to tell the DoD what they should and should not be doing 
(J. Solomon, personal communication, September 15, 2017). 
OSD-P is interested in understanding how to codify some of the best practices and 
how to ensure that training is institutionalized. Currently (in 2017), much of the training is 
ad hoc (J. Solomon, personal communication, September 15, 2017). The DoD does not 
need to train people to fly planes and do logistics to support an HA/DR mission. The DoD 
needs to train people about the unique environment of HA/DR. This includes dealing with 
the host nation government and host nation military, working with OFDA in a supporting 
role, dealing with civilians, learning how to plan for transition, and understanding unique 
indicators of withdrawal (J. Solomon, personal communication, September 15, 2017). 
Many joint training exercises between the United States and other foreign partners 
is conducted as preparation for future HA/DR operations. However, in reality, the HA/DR-
framed training is a blanket to conduct training that otherwise could not or would not have 
been achieved because of political and/or strategic factors. By conducting exercises under 
the disguise of HA/DR, the DoD lessens its credibility as an actor in the humanitarian 
response community and also reduces the importance of training for future HA/DR 
missions (J. Solomon, personal communication, September 15, 2017). 
7. HA/DR as a Mission of the DoD 
According to OSD-P, there is no policy stating that HA/DR is a core mission of the 
DoD (J. Solomon, personal communication, September 15, 2017). HA/DR missions are 
civilian-led by the USG, with OFDA designated as the lead federal agency. The established 
process allows OFDA to focus priorities towards HA/DR, while the DoD can focus its 
priorities toward defense strategy and combat operations. However, the DoD is assigned 
the mission of supporting HA/DR when required (J. Solomon, personal communication, 
September 15, 2017). The DoD is utilized to fill the humanitarian gap. When that gap can 
be met by other competent organizations, the DoD’s mission is over, and it transitions back 
to a focus on primary missions. 
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HA/DR for the USMC would be better classified as a critical mission, but not a 
core mission. The USMC is well-positioned to support HA/DR due to its expeditionary 
nature, forward positioning of MEUs, and reduced footprint of operating aboard ship while 
supporting the mission. Therefore, the USMC has a greater need to prepare to support 
future HA/DR missions than other branches of service in the DoD (J. Solomon, personal 
communication, September 15, 2017).  
8. Improving Effectiveness 
By improving effectiveness in HA, the USMC can set conditions for future mission 
success by fostering healthy relationships with the host nation and affected population. By 
improving efficiency, the USMC can decrease excessive burden on USMC units in support 
of HA/DR operations. Efficiency can decrease the financial burden on the DoD and the 
operational burden on USMC units. In order to apply these lessons learned, we offer a few 





Recommendations were developed using a four-step HA/DR readiness 
identification process shown in Figure 14. This process was developed by the authors and 
adapted from the work of Apte (2017). Step one is the action taken by the responding JTF, 
or lessons learned through our analysis. Additionally, step one prescribes the action/lesson 
learned to the most applicable competency. Step two is a brief evaluation of the 
action/lesson learned from the perspective of a partner humanitarian organization. This 
humanitarian lens is relevant because the DoD conducts HA/DR missions in a supporting 
role and must partner with multiple other agencies. Step three is the action to improve 
readiness for future disasters. Lastly, step four is the better outcome achieved by the 
recommended readiness action. 
Figure 14. HA/DR Readiness Identification Process. 
Adapted from Apte (2017). 
  
Our recommendations are applicable to the USMC, and many to the DoD as a 
whole as it prepares to support HA/DR missions in the future. These recommendations are 
limited to the scope of information and knowledge management, as well as the needs 
assessments. The recommendations are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Readiness for Future Disasters 
Action/Lesson 
Learned 







-Lack of (barriers 
to) information 
sharing external to 
U.S. agencies 
-I/KM -APAN requires 
registered access 
and tracks users/ 
organizations 
-APAN is 
associated with the 
USG/DoD (lack of 
impartiality) 




-APAN is viewed 
as a data dump and 
information is not 
validated, verified, 






platform that is 
available to all 









*This is one area 
where the DoD can 
“push” a capability 
regardless of the 
size/nature of the 
disaster 
-Lack of sufficient 
communications 
architecture for a 
JTF staff in a 
HA/DR operation 





& rapid growth of a 
staff  
-Establishment of 
ISP contracts and 
SOP for a JTF staff 
with SOFA partners 
and likely HA/DR 
nations 
-OSINT analysts have 




-JTF staff all on one 






dynamic and fluid 
-Host nation, 
NMOs, and IOs 
have differing 
levels of 
capabilities in relief 
for each disaster 
-Develop an SOP 
that is agile, 
flexible, and 
expedient to 
respond to the 
dynamic 
environment 
-The JTF is capable 







access to foreign 
sites 
-I/KM -Hundreds of 
foreign actors may 











network supports a 
JTF-sized staff with 













foreign partners is 
paramount 
-Importance of 
LNOs to MNCC, 
OFDA, HN, etc.  
-I/KM -U.N. cluster 
system used to 
create unity of 
efforts 
-Possibly dozens of 
foreign militaries  
-United States 
response is a 
supporting effort to 
OFDA and host 
nation 
-Personnel trained 
in JHOC and 
HART courses to 
serve as LNOs in a 
response 
-LNOs provided at 
the discretion of 
OFDA DART  
-Full integration with 
the international relief 
effort 
-High tempo 





imagery can be 
useful in HA 


















-Improved I/KM with 









-I/KM -The HN, NGOs, 
and local populace 
are the primary 
responders in a 
disaster 
-The MITAM 
process is the 














assistance are more 
likely to use formal 
channels to request 
support 
-The JTF responds to 
validated and 
prioritized requests 





avoid direct contact 
with local populace 
-Many local actors 
including the host 
nation are 
-Develop a rapid 
assessment 
capability inclusive 
of open source 
analysis to conduct 
early assessments 
-The JTF is capable 
of meeting the 
disaster demand with 















information is often 
the most readily 
available and useful 










airfields will be 
highly trafficked 






- Knowledge of 
remote locations 




and MSIDS aboard 
relief sorties can 
collect precious 










-NA -Military is a last 
resort 
-Military should 







efforts to competent 
organization 
-Develop an exit 
strategy based on 
dialogue with the 
disaster assistance 
response team 
(DART) leader and 
U.S. ambassador 
that determines 
when DoD’s unique 
capabilities are no 
longer required 





-NA -Real time 
information 






various forums in a 















decision makers with 















of camps, displaced 
persons, and 




must be included 
in the HAST 





- Host nation 
METOC 
capabilities may be 
degraded 





- HAST includes 
METOC 
representation 
- USMC METOC 
capabilities 
complement HN 
capabilities to fill 















should be purposive 
- Avoid assessment 









OFDA or host 
nation personnel, 
trained in primary 
data collection to 
answer specific 
RFIs about the 
affected population 
-Decreased burden on 




community and host 
nation 
-Reliable information 
for decision makers 
-C2 suites not 
reported on DRRS 
-I/KM -Low technology 
options are best for 
initial days after a 
disaster 
-C2 capabilities will 
grow as more relief 
efforts arrive 
-DJC2, ECCS, and 
other anticipated C2 
suites should be 
added to DRRS 
report for MEBs. 
SOPs plan for 
worst-case 
scenarios for 
establishing C2.  
-MEBs are ready to 
rapidly respond with 
low technology 
options and later with 
robust C2 suites. 
 86 
B. SUMMARY 
The Marine Corps is forward deployed and uniquely suited for operating in the 
littoral regions of the world. As a result, the life-saving and key enabling capabilities that 
the Marine Corps brings to a humanitarian relief effort are immense. This research sought 
to identify and evaluate gaps in such USMC capabilities within the competencies of NA 
and I/KM. A review of relevant research revealed important aspects of the humanitarian 
sector, such as the nature of humanitarian operations, the way information sharing is 
conducted between various actors, different types of assessments and their purposes, 
identification of all the various actors, and a review of USMC readiness metrics. We 
evaluated four key case studies in which the USMC responded as the leading DoD branch 
in a JTF: the 2010 Haitian earthquake, the 2011 Japanese tsunami, the 2013 Philippines 
Typhoon Haiyan, and the 2015 Nepalese earthquake. Additional analysis was conducted 
on information gathered from personal interviews and formal trainings. By combining 
lessons from these sources, we developed specific recommendations and readiness metrics 
for NA and I/KM. It is important to remember that these metrics must be applied to a 
humanitarian setting in which the USMC is a supporting effort of OFDA. Operating outside 
of this prescribed role risks high financial costs, excessive burden on the force, and creation 
of a dependency on aid. By improving HA/DR efficiency and effectiveness, the USMC can 
save lives, alleviate human suffering, and bolster international relations. The well-
grounded findings of this research related to NA and I/KM offer a basis of understanding 
for USMC planners to apply in any foreign natural HA/DR setting.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
While this research explores needs assessments and information/knowledge 
management, further research needs to be conducted to develop readiness metrics for 
deployment and distribution, supply, health service support, and collaboration 
and governance in HA/DR operations. These remaining competencies are critical in 
HA/DR operations and must be thoroughly investigated in order to provide a full list of 
readiness metrics to the USMC. Furthermore, this series of research focuses on foreign 
natural disasters, which leaves both domestic and complex disasters to be evaluated. The 
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USMC may operate in any of these three types of disasters and must be equally prepared 
for each. As this thesis was being written, two separate joint task forces were created to 
respond to damages caused by hurricanes in Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the Caribbean 
islands. In settings such as this, different conclusions, metrics, and best practices will be 
identified. Understanding the different dynamics of these operations is very important for 
USMC planners.  
Several findings in this research also merit additional investigation, specifically, 
the opportunity for the USMC to bolster USAID/OFDA with information analysis 
capabilities during disasters. The USMC’s information analysis capabilities with 
specialties including topographic, imagery, open source information, and METOC, 
represent a huge opportunity to aid USG and international humanitarian efforts. Another 
specific finding in our research that merits additional investigation is the repetitive lack of 
sufficient bandwidth and suitable communications networks for a joint task force–sized 
HA/DR response. This finding was present in all four cases and has the potential to 
seriously impact a DoD response. Solutions to this deficiency offered in this research need 
to be further scrutinized to develop actionable options for a Joint Task Force. 
Lastly, throughout the research, issues with the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, 
and Civic Aid (OHDACA) Appropriation consistently came up. Specifically, during the 
Japanese disaster, the JSDF generated many of the requests for assistance directly to the 
DoD. The DoD coordinated directly with the JSDF to complete the tasks. This is often 
referred to as mil to mil requests. However, OFDA must validate the requests for them to 
be reimbursable under OHDACA. In the case of Japan, many requests appeared to be 
completed and then validated later by OFDA. Therefore, the standard protocol for 
processing and validating requests through a MITAM appeared to be broken or simply 
ignored. Additionally, in the Japan case, the nuclear disaster challenged the OHDACA 
funding process. The question was, does OHDACA funding apply to the relief efforts to 
support the nuclear crisis? Future research should investigate the OHDACA funding 
process and identify a clear set of standards for how the DoD responds to disasters and 
requests OHDACA funding. This research is needed to provide more transparency and 
accountability to the appropriation process. 
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